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FINTECH’S ROLE IN EXACERBATING OR 
REDUCING THE WEALTH GAP 
Pamela Foohey* 
Nathalie Martin** 
Research shows that Black, Latinx, and other minorities pay more for 
credit and banking services, and that wealth accumulation differs starkly 
between their households and white households. The link between debt in-
equality and the wealth gap, however, remains less thoroughly explored, 
particularly in light of new credit products and debt-like banking services, 
such as early wage access and other fintech innovations. These innovations 
both hold the promise of reducing racial and ethnic disparities in lending 
and bring concerns that they may be exploited in ways that perpetuate ine-
quality. They also come at a time when policy makers are considering how 
to help communities of color rebuild their wealth, presenting an opportunity 
to critique policy proposals. This Article leverages that opportunity by syn-
thesizing research about the long-term costs of debt inequality on commu-
nities of color, adding an in-depth analysis of several new advances in 
banking and lending, and proposing several key principles for reducing 
debt inequality as an input to the wealth gap.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Good Girls, the popular American crime comedy-drama television series, 
follows the lives of three women living in Detroit, Michigan.1 The crime aspect 
of the show arises because all three women face financial crises and decide to 
rob a grocery store to acquire additional cash.2 Each woman also considers dif-
ferent solutions to her own compounding problems in light of their crime.3 Ruby 
Hill, a Black woman, takes out a payday loan.4 In Good Girls, fiction follows 
reality. People of color use payday loans and other fringe lending at a much 
higher rate than white Americans.5 
Reliance on high-cost credit and other nontraditional banking services is 
expensive. As described by two scholars at Georgetown Law’s Center on Privacy 
& Technology, “[p]ayday loans hurt people. . . . [T]hese loans are for most bor-
rowers grinding debt traps that ensnare families struggling to pay the regular 
costs of everyday life: rent, prescription medicine costs, the heating bill.”6 Writ-
ing about a workshop on sales lead generation organized by the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), they continue: “these and other harmful effects of payday 
 
 1. Lacey Vorrasi-Banis, ‘Good Girls’ Series Premiere React: Pilot, ENT. WKLY. (Feb. 26, 2018, 11:00 
PM), https://www.ew.com/recap/good-girls-series-premiere/ [https://perma.cc/L6Q7-SEU2].  
 2. See id.; Shirley Li, Why Good Girls Is Such a Rewarding Show, ATL. (May 24, 2019), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2019/05/good-girls-nbc-season-2-christina-hendricks/590173/ 
[https://perma.cc/73HU-6AU5].  
 3. Li, supra note 2; Vorrasi-Banis, supra note 1.  
 4. Lauren Busser, Good Girls Review: One Last Time (Season 2 Episode 9), TELL-TALE TV (Apr. 29, 
2019), https://telltaletv.com/2019/04/good-girls-review-one-last-time-season-2-episode-9/ [https://perma.cc/ 
YHM8-J92W].  
 5. See Nathalie Martin & Ernesto A. Longa, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do Payday and Title Loans 
Really Serve the Middle Class?, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 524, 534–35 (2012) (overviewing findings about 
the demographics of people who use high-cost loan); Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between 
Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 751, 798 (2012) (discussing payday lending in Native American communities); PEW SAFE SMALL-
DOLLAR LOANS RSCH. PROJECT, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY BORROW, AND 
WHY, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 1, 9 (July 2012), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploaded-
files/pcs_assets/2012/pewpaydaylendingreportpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP4B-R9ZR] (reporting that African 
Americans take out payday loans at a rate 105% higher than other races and ethnicities); infra Section III.C.  
 6. Alvaro Bedoya & Clare Garvie, Comments of Alvaro Bedoya and Clare Garvie, Center on Privacy & 
Technology at Georgetown Law, on “Follow the Lead: An FTC Workshop on Lead Generation”, 1, 1 (Dec. 18, 
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/12/00017-99877.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/V99S-X3LJ].   
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loans were a recurring theme in panel discussions. But one issue was never raised 
in any of the discussions—the fact that payday loans do not hurt equally.”7 
These observations reflect another reality. Although scholars continue to 
write about the “debt trap” of high-cost credit, their discussions of these products 
often lack a robust linkage of the products’ harms to larger issues of income and 
wealth inequality.8 Similarly, though research continues to draw attention to the 
racial and ethnic disparities in student loan debt repayment, redlining and sub-
prime home loans, and other credit and banking products,9 each discussion often 
pays only passing attention to its place within extensive and long-standing issues 
of wealth accumulation in America.10 
Scholars and researchers cannot be faulted for this. Every link is part of a 
larger chain of discrimination that prevents people of color from converting their 
income into wealth, thereby deepening the wealth gap.11 Each link helps to ex-
plain how expensive credit and unequal access to banking services exacerbate 
the wealth gap.12 Each link also is needed to consider how innovations in bank-
ing and financial services, such as in the financial technology (“fintech”) area,13 
may either remedy or exacerbate the wealth gap. Indeed, the details about each 
link have allowed policy makers to promote in-depth proposals designed to 
tackle income inequality and the wealth gap.14 The existence of multiple pro-
posals creates an opportune moment to consider how to reverse unequal access 
 
 7. Id.   
 8. There are a few notable exceptions. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: 
EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 138–61 (2018) (detailing how unequal credit con-
tributes to inequality); Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1094 
(2019) (discussing how high-cost credit masquerades as a tool of “social provision” while “deepening economic, 
and thus social, inequality.”); Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, and Distri-
bution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 260 (2019) (discussing the use of consumer law to target economic ine-
quality).   
 9. See, e.g., James A. Allen, The Color of Algorithms: An Analysis and Proposed Research Agenda for 
Deterring Algorithmic Redlining, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 219, 255 (2019) (detailing how algorithms can be used 
to perpetuate redlining in housing); Lisa Rice & Deirdre Swesnik, Discriminatory Effects of Credit Scoring on 
Communities of Color, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935, 937–38 (2013) (noting the percentages of households of 
colors versus white households sold subprime home loans leading up to the Great Recession); Andrew F. Haugh-
wout et al., Just Released: Racial Disparities in Student Loan Outcomes, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2019/11/just-released-racial-disparities-in-student-loan-out-
comes.html [https://perma.cc/ZX2N-4D3W] (relying on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
show that black-majority zip codes have the highest and fastest-growing student loan balances, and the highest 
student loan default rates); see also infra Part III.   
 10. See generally Allen, supra note 9; Rice & Swesnik, supra note 9; Haughwout et al., supra note 9. 
 11. Calvin Schermerhorn, Why the Racial Gap Persists More Than 150 Years after Emancipation, WASH. 
POST (June 19, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook2019/06/19/why-racial-wealth-gap-
persists-more-than-years-after-emancipation/ [https://perma.cc/D4VR-8LMZ]. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See Kristin Johnson et al., Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward 
Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499, 499–502 (2019) (detailing the intersection of “fintech” and 
finance); Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781, 787–88 (2018) 
(defining and discussing “fintech”); Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 
65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 238–40 (2018) (defining and discussing “fintech”).       
 14. For instance, somewhat unique to the 2020 presidential primary process, candidates proposed detailed 
policies addressing economic and social issues. Some of their proposals are built on and indirectly acknowledge 
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to banking and lending services (that is, debt inequality), particularly in light of 
new innovations, which are largely marketed to Americans at the bottom of the 
wealth spectrum.15 
This Article connects those links in the wealth gap chain to propose key 
principles for the consumer banking and lending sector to follow in order to ame-
liorate the debt inequality that feeds wealth inequality.16 Part II sets the stage for 
our focus on unequal access to credit and banking services. It first examines the 
history of America’s income inequality. The income gap has grown exponen-
tially over recent decades, with both the middle class and working poor losing 
ground in terms of real wages, with the most loss accruing to racial and ethnic 
minorities.17 
 
the debt inequality we analyze in this Article. See, e.g., A Working Agenda for Black America, WARREN 
DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/agenda-black-america (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https:// 
perma.cc/8S9H-XSN2] (detailing plans to help Black Americans achieve “economic security,” which includes 
closing the racial wealth gap); End Wall Street’s Strangehold On Our Economy, WARREN DEMOCRATS, 
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/wall-street/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https:www.perma.cc/HFH6-6SNR] 
(discussing postal banking and creating access to lower-cost credit products); Fair Banking for All, BERNIE 
SANDERS, https://berniesanders.com/issues/fair-banking-for-all/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ 
PR7H-MXPG] (proposing capping consumer loans and credit card interest rates at 15%, capping ATM fees, and 
establishing postal banking); Peter Wade, Kamala Harris Proposes $100 Billion Plan to Close Racial Home-
ownership Gap, ROLLING STONE (July 6, 2019, 4:09 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-
news/kamala-harris-close-racial-homeownership-gap-85614/ [https://perma.cc/BQ2D-JUZ7]; Deborah 
D’Souza, Pete Buttigieg’s Economic Plan: Keep Calm and Cut Costs, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 17, 2020), https:// 
www.investopedia.com/pete-buttigieg-s-economic-plan-modetate-hopes-for-a-living-479502 [https://perma. 
cc/T2C2-KGJC]; Joe Biden’s Vision for America’s Future, JOE BIDEN FOR AM., https://joebiden.com/joes-vision/ 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6EZS-JAWY] (listing rebuilding America’s middle class as one of 
a handful of key priorities). Considered together, the detail and nuance in candidates’ discussions and proposals 
is striking. Calling out the multi-faceted threat of wealth gaps and income inequality itself marks a momentous 
change in public political discourse. This Article, however, does not discuss the details of these and other policy 
proposals. Instead, it focuses on why consumer banking and credit services have exacerbated and continue to 
exacerbate the wealth gap, and based on this analysis, begins to build the how of combating unequal access to 
these services. 
 15. Odinet, supra note 13, at 784.  
 16. This Article focuses on the income and wealth gap and assesses the contribution of financial discrim-
ination to those disparities. It touches on racial and ethnic disparities in home ownership, student loans, and fringe 
credit. See infra Part III. There are other key contributors to Americans’ continuing struggles, including rising 
health care costs, the failure of state and local governments to deliver essential services, and the concentration of 
power, both economic and political, in the hands of few huge corporations, that, in the interest of scope, this 
Article will not discuss. See JAMES KWAK, Introduction to TAKE BACK OUR PARTY: RESTORING THE 
DEMOCRATIC LEGACY, (Am. Prospect ed. 2019), https://prospect.org/politics/take-back-our-party-restoring-the-
democratic-legacy/ [http://www.perma.cc/WB27-AJM2] (noting these factors); Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers 
Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1357–59 (2015) (linking the anticom-
petitive practices of sophisticated and politically influential companies to perpetuated inequality).   
 17. See Taylor Telford, Income Inequality in America Is the Highest It’s Been Since Census Bureau Started 
Tracking It, Data Shows, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2019, 2:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi-
ness/2019/09/26/income-inequality-america-highest-its-been-since-census-started-tracking-it-data-show/ 
[https://perma.cc/GDQ5-LX6M] (linking systemic inequality and income inequality); Robert Manduca, Income 
Inequality and the Persistence of Racial Economic Disparities, 5 SOCIO. SCI. 182, 182 (2018) (noting that more 
than 50 years after the Civil Rights Act, Black–white family income disparities in the United States remain almost 
exactly the same as in 1968); Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequal-
ity/a-guide-to-statistics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality [https://perma.cc/N8JL-63HW] (summarizing 
the “broad facts of income inequality over the past seven decades . . . .”); see also infra Sections II.A., II.B.    
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Part II then links income inequality to America’s persistent wealth gap. The 
United States now has more income and wealth inequality than any other devel-
oped country—and more than during the 1920s, just before the Great Depres-
sion.18 This gap has redistributed wealth from the poor and middle classes to the 
rich.19 To put this in perspective, the three wealthiest people in America have 
more than the bottom half of Americans, all 160 million combined.20 The wealth 
gap between white Americans and racial and ethnic minorities likewise has not 
diminished over past decades,21 despite the passage of anti-discrimination laws 
during the same period.22 
Income inequality and wealth building also connect with debt inequality.23 
The inability of some Americans, particularly minorities, to access credit and 
banking services at a reasonable cost is a key reason why these households can-
not transform their income into wealth.24 Parts III and IV explain why this re-
mains the case by focusing on how debt inequality may aid wealth redistribution 
and exacerbate the wealth gap.  
Part III reviews the rise of the use of debt in America. It focuses on the 
demographics of subprime home mortgages, student loans, payday loans, and 
other high-cost lending.25 Disparate use of these products by communities of 
color chips away at savings, prevents wealth accumulation, and exacerbates 
long-term economic losses across generations. This discussion also notes how 
government policies have contributed to this wealth redistribution, with an eye 
to understanding how regulation has failed in the past.  
Part IV showcases a few “advances” in banking and credit services that rely 
on innovations in fintech: payroll cards, early wage access programs, and auto-
mobile loans, such as Uber’s short-lived car financing program that ended after 
 
 18. See Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, Income Inequality in the U.S. Is Rising Most Rapidly Among 
Asians, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 12, 2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/07/12/income-inequality-in-
the-u-s-is-rising-most-rapidly-among-asians/ [https://perma.cc/EPW8-8YG8] (“[I]ncome inequality in the U.S. 
is higher than among other advanced economies . . . .”); infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.  
 19. KWAK, supra note 16. 
 20. Noah Kirsch, The 3 Richest Americans Hold More Wealth Than Bottom 50% of the Country Study 
Finds, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2017, 12:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/noahkirsch/2017/11/09/the-3-richest-
americans-hold-more-wealth-than-bottom-50-of-country-study-finds/#30bd9e83cf86 [https://perma.cc/KK8J-
HCAP]; infra Sections II.A., II.B. 
 21. We focus substantially on Black households and provide some information on Latinx, Native Ameri-
can, and Asian-American households. See infra Sections II.B., II.C.  
 22. This Part includes discussions of disparities in employment and home ownership as key contributors 
to the persistent wealth gap. See KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL 
ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP 3, 5 (2019) (detailing how the push for Black home-
ownership was co-opted by banks and real estate agents to make profits at the expense of the wealth building 
which typically accrues from owning houses); Brentin Mock, Why Can’t We Close the Racial Wealth Gap?, 
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Mar. 21, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/03/racial-wealth-gap-
income-inequality-black-white-households/585325/ [https://perma.cc/69EH-QVVE] (discussing how employ-
ment patterns feed the wealth gap); infra Section II.C.; see also MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: 
BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2017) (presenting a history of wealth building post-slavery). 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. See infra Parts III, IV.  
 25. See infra Part III.    
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a $20 million settlement with the FTC.26 By delineating these products’ mechan-
ics, the history of their emergence, and the laws (or lack thereof) surrounding 
them, this Part draws out the basics of how regulation of banking and credit ser-
vices can serve as a part of solutions to effectively tackle the wealth gap. 
Having mapped a network among income inequality, the wealth gap, and 
discrimination in access to banking and credit services, Part V draws lessons 
from fintech products to set forth our four tenets for reducing debt inequality as 
an input to wealth inequality: providing access, delivering choice, accounting for 
discrimination across its variants, and creating a public option.27 In this discus-
sion, we again focus on tackling racial and ethnic disparities in banking and 
credit.  
The COVID-19 pandemic intensified the imperative to understand and 
combat debt inequality. Within in a couple months of the novel coronavirus’s 
emergence, tens of millions of Americans lost their jobs, saw their hours cut, or 
were called on to perform essential tasks.28 People of color experienced job loss 
at higher rates, while also being more likely to be deemed essential workers, 
forcing them to put their lives on the line.29 Reports detailing how many people, 
and particularly Black and Latinx households, could not survive a few weeks or 
months without monetary help brought America’s stark disparity in income and 
 
 26. See James J. Angel & Douglas M. McCabe, The Ethics of Payment: Paper, Plastic, or Bitcoin, 132 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 603, 603 (2015) (discussing the “ethical implications” of payment cards); Chris Opfer, ‘Early Wage’ 
Apps Aim to Disrupt Payday Loans, Two-Week Cycle, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 1, 2019, 5:15 AM), https://news. 
bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/early-wage-apps-aim-to-disrupt-payday-loans-two-week-cycle [https:// 
perma.cc/D54G-5JD4] (overviewing early wage programs); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Uber Agrees to 
Pay $20 Million to Settle FTC Charges That It Recruited Prospective Drivers with Exaggerated Earnings Claims 
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/uber-agrees-pay-20-million-settle-ftc-
charges-it-recruited [https://perma.cc/JJH8-44MS]; infra Part IV.   
 27. See infra Part V.   
 28. See Dominic Rushe & Amanda Holpuch, 20m Americans Lost Their Jobs in April in Worst Month 
Since Great Depression, GUARDIAN (May 8, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/may/08/april-
jobs-report-us-unemployment-rate [https://perma.cc/TW9V-MT36]; Campbell Robertson & Robert Gebeloff, 
How Millions of Women Became the Most Essential Workers in America, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2020), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/us/coronavirus-women-essential-workers.html [https://perma.cc/M4RG-ZR2G]; 
Camila Domonoske, Poll: Nearly 1 in 5 Households Has Lost Work Because Of Pandemic, NPR (Mar. 17, 2020, 
12:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/17/817158521/poll-nearly-1-in-5-households-have-lost-work-because 
-of-pandemic [https://perma.cc/2KY3-696D].    
 29. See Connor Maxwell & Danyelle Solomon, The Economic Fallout of the Coronavirus for People of 
Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 14, 2020, 9:20 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/ 
news/2020/04/14/483125/economic-fallout-coronavirus-people-color/ [https://perma.cc/TK3S-AGNQ]; Cathe-
rine Powell, Color of Covid: The Racial Justice Paradox of Our New Stay-At-Home Economy, CNN (Apr. 18, 
2020, 9:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/10/opinions/covid-19-people-of-color-labor-market-disparities-
powell/index.html [https://perma.cc/8ZEP-TAL3].  
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savings into focus.30 For instance, when Congress enacted the CARES Act,31 
questions about how “relief rebate” payments would be delivered to the millions 
of unbanked Americans quickly emerged, highlighting how disparate access to 
electronic payment and banking systems exacerbates race and class differ-
ences.32 Minorities also worried more about debt collection if they defaulted on 
existing obligations, with coronavirus being termed a “new housing crisis for 
communities of color.”33 
As Lani Guiner and Gerald Torres wrote, race “is like a miner’s canary.”34 
“Miner’s canary” describes how miners would carry canaries, which are more 
susceptible to toxic gases, into mines with them. If the canary collapsed, miners 
knew to leave.35 Focusing on Black, Latinx, and other minority Americans, al-
lows for a detailed and sustained discussion of racial and ethnic disparities in 
access to debt, income inequality, and ability to build wealth.36 The distress of 
these households, as this Article sets forth, is, as Guiner and Torrres wrote, “the 
first sign of danger that threaten us all.”37 The exacerbation of income and wealth 
inequalities among communities of color in recent decades signals a potential 
coming economic and social collapse in the United States, potentially hastened 
by the economic fallout from the pandemic.38 This Article concludes by return-
 
 30. See, e.g., Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017, FED. RES. (May 2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2017-report-economic-well-being-us-households-201805.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G497-75JG] (reporting that less than a quarter of lower-income Americans have enough sav-
ings to cover basic expenses for three months); Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christopher K. Odinet, The 
Folly of Credit as Pandemic Relief, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 126, 134–36 (2020) (discussing savings and ex-
penses); Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christopher K. Odinet, CARES Act Gimmicks: How Not To Give 
People Money During a Pandemic and What to Do Instead, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 81, 87–88 (2020) 
[hereinafter CARES Act Gimmicks], https://illinoislawreview.org/online/cares-act-gimmicks/ [https://perma.cc/ 
AB4E-WHDF] (discussing savings and expenses).    
 31. Coronavirus Economic Stabilization (CARES Act), 15 U.S.C. § 116. The bill is available at https:// 
www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr748/BILLS-116hr748enr.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLY2-SZK9].  
 32. See CARES Act Gimmicks, supra note 30, at 88–89 (discussing the relief rebates). The Treasury De-
partment decided to deliver relief rebates on prepaid debit cards, but not until months after the CARES Act’s 
enactment and when people needed the cash infusion. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury is 
Delivering Millions of Economic Impact Payments by Prepaid Debit Card (May 18, 2020), https://home.treas-
ury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1012 [https://perma.cc/E9TC-BZ6G].    
 33. Evan Weinberger, Coronavirus Could Be New Housing Crisis for Communities of Color, BLOOMBERG 
L. (May 20, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/coronavirus-could-be-new-housing-
crisis-for-communities-of-color [https://perma.cc/QZ45-NCWY]; see Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christo-
pher K. Odinet, The Debt Collection Pandemic, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 222, 240 (2020); Lee Fang, Debt 
Collection Industry Deems Itself Essential to “Financial Health” of Consumers, Fights COVID-19 Shutdown, 
THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 27, 2020, 1:40 PM), https://theintercept.com/2020/03/27/debt-collection-industry-deems-
itself-essential-to-financial-health-of-consumers-fights-covid-shutdown/ [https://perma.cc/3GVN-VNV6].     
 34. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, 
TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11 (2002).    
 35. See id.   
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. GUINER & TORRES, supra note 34, at 11.  
 38. See id. at 11–12 (“[T]he association between those who are left out and social justice deficiencies in 
the larger community.”).     
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ing to the “miner’s canary” metaphor to emphasize the gravity of adequately ac-
counting for debt inequality’s place in answering the income and wealth inequal-
ity conundrum.39 
II. THE DISPARATE ECONOMY: INCOME INEQUALITY AND THE WEALTH GAP 
Economic equality, the equal distribution of income and economic oppor-
tunity,40 is fundamental to comprehensive human and civil rights, and America 
has been moving backwards in this regard for decades.41 In real dollars, wages 
effectively have remained stagnant since the 1960s despite rising productivity.42 
Over the past thirty years, low-wage workers have experienced declines in real 
wages while higher-wage earners have seen double-digit increases in their real 
wages.43 The racial income gap is particularly stark, with median Black and 
Latinx households making over $10,000 a year less than white households.44 Part 
of the disparity traces to differences in educational opportunities and attain-
ment,45 but education alone cannot account for racial and ethnic wage disparities 
or income inequality more generally. Instead, income inequality leads to a host 
of interrelated problems that keep ordinary Americans in a state of constant fi-
nancial struggle.46 
 
 39. See infra Part V.   
 40. See Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court Contributes to Economic 
Inequality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 389, 393–94 (2014) (discussing leading factors identified as contributing to eco-
nomic inequality); Concepts of Inequality, U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFS. (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.un. 
org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_dev_issues/dsp_policy_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5BR-C4U3] (dis-
cussing various definitions of economic inequality). 
 41. See Bill Chappel, U.S. Income Inequality Worsens, Widening to a New Gap, NPR (Sept. 26, 2019, 
2:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/764654623/u-s-income-inequality-worsens-widening-to-a-new-gap 
[https://perma.cc/P6TQ-THXK] (“The gap between the richest and the poorest U.S. households is now the largest 
it’s been in the past 50 years. . . . U.S. income inequality was ‘significantly higher’ in 2018 than in 2017 . . ..”); 
Van Loo, supra note 8, at 213 (discussing using consumer law to target economic inequality).  
 42. See James Kwak, ‘Take Back Our Party’ Chapter 2: Bad Policy, Am. PROSPECT figs. 2.2, 2.3 (Dec. 
13, 2019), https://prospect.org/takebackourparty/chapter-2-bad-policy/ [https://perma.cc/H8V7-RUV6] (detail-
ing average pre-tax income for all Americans and the bottom 50% of Americans); Drew Desilver, For Most U.S. 
Workers, Real Wages Have Barely Budged in Decades, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/ [https:// 
perma.cc/HH9X-N2CA] (reporting average hourly wages between 1964 and 2018); Jay Shambaugh et al., Thir-
teen Facts About Wage Growth, BROOKINGS iii fig. B (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/09/thp_20170926_thirteen_facts_wage_growth.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XXH-JRVN] (comparing real 
wages to real labor productivity from 1947 to 2017).  
 43. See Desilver, supra note 42; Lawrence Mishel et al., Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, ECON. POL’Y 
INST. 6 (Jan. 6, 2015), https://termadiary.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/wage-stagnation-in-nine-charts.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7Q63-K83N] (providing an overview of real hourly wages based on wage percentile from 1979 
to 2013).  
 44. See Shambaugh et al., supra note 42, at 3–6 (discussing the education wage premium, technological 
changes, and wage disparities between racial disparities); see also Gilman, supra note 40, at 392 (noting research 
linking economic inequality with changes in technology and how education no longer provides workers with the 
requisite skills).  
 45. See 20 Facts About U.S. Inequality that Everyone Should Know, STAN. CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQ. 
(2011), https://inequality.stanford.edu/publications/20-facts-about-us-inequality-everyone-should-know [https:// 
perma.cc/9RWD-ANR8] (reporting that only college graduates have seen growth, in real dollars in median earn-
ings since 1979 and that college enrollment is highest among white Americans).  
 46. See infra notes 74–94. 
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Growing income inequality, in large part, has created America’s disparate 
economy and widening wealth gap, leading to a society in which those people 
with resources grow wealthier to the detriment of others.47 Indeed, in 2014, Pres-
ident Barack Obama called economic inequality the “defining challenge of our 
time.”48 In this Part, we discuss income inequality, in general and as it relates to 
racial and ethnic inequality. We then link income inequality to America’s wealth 
gap, again focusing on racial and ethnic wealth gaps, particularly as connected 
with Black home ownership. Overall, this Part demonstrates how income and 
wealth inequality has become one of America’s most defining features.49 
A. Widening Income Inequality over the Past Decades 
The United States presently has the highest level of income inequality 
among those countries with the largest economies in the world,50 including India, 
the land of the untouchables and the caste system.51 The United States did not 
always hold such a distinction. The decades from the end of World War II into 
the early 1970s brought widespread prosperity, during which most Americans 
saw their incomes grow as they shared in productivity gains.52 In contrast, be-
tween 1970 and 2016, the gap between American households at the bottom and 
the top of the income spectrum increased more than a quarter, with income con-
centration at the top of the ladder rising to levels last seen at the beginning of 
nineteenth century, a time known as the “Roaring Twenties,” when wealthy in-
dustrialists controlled America.53 
 
 47. See Robert Manduca, Income Inequality and the Persistence of Racial Economic Disparities, 5 SOCIO. 
SCI. 182, 182 (2018).  
 48. President Barack Obama, Remarks on Mobility at the Town Hall Education Arts Recreation Campus 
(THEARC) (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-eco-
nomic-mobility [https://perma.cc/944W-XR97].  
 49. See generally RONALD P. FORMISANO, PLUTOCRACY IN AMERICA: HOW INCREASING INEQUALITY 
DESTROYS THE MIDDLE CLASS AND EXPLOITS THE POOR (2015).  
 50. See Kochhar & Cilluffo, supra note 18. Across countries, income inequality is measured by the Gini 
coefficient (or index). It ranges from zero, perfect equality, to one, perfect inequality, where all wealth is held by 
one person. See Hershey H. Friedman & Sarah Hertz, Is the United States Still the Best Country in the World? 
Think Again 3–4 (June 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2622722; see also 
Kochhar & Cilluffo, supra note 18 (describing Gini coefficient and U.S. ranking relative to other advanced econ-
omies). In 2016, the US’s Gini coefficient was 0.415, as compared to France’s 0.327 and Sweden’s 0.292, both 
as of 2015. Gini Index (World Bank Estimate), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V646-NA5G].    
 51. See Gini Index (World Bank Estimate)-India, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indica-
tor/SI.POV.GINI?locations=IN (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/PRG5-Q4UC] (listing India’s Gini 
index at 0.378 in 2011).  
 52. See Stone et al., supra note 17 (noting that from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, “[i]ncomes grew 
rapidly and at roughly the same rate up and down the income ladder” and that the “[income] gap between those 
high up the income ladder and those on the middle and lower rungs—while substantial—did not change much 
during this period.”).  
 53. See id.; Kochhar & Cilluffo, supra note 18; KWAK, supra note 16 (“From 1980 to 2014, the total 
incomes of the top 1 percent more than tripled, while those of the bottom 50 percent remained essentially un-
changed. The previous 34 years, from 1946 to 1980, saw the opposite pattern: Income growth was substantially 
higher for the bottom 50 percent than for the top 1 percent.”).  
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Income inequality is so stark that America’s top 10% of earners now make 
on average nine times as much income than the bottom 90%.54 The top 1% makes 
on average over thirty-nine times more income than the bottom 99%.55 And the 
top 0.1% makes on average almost 190 times more than the bottom 99.9% of 
Americans.56 
Two primary factors contribute to continued income inequality.57 First is 
the wage gap. The top echelon of Americans experience growth in income from 
their salaries and hourly wages, while other workers see their real wages decline 
despite contributing to increasing their employers’ productivity.58 Second is the 
interest that those Americans with savings make every year passively through 
investments, including houses.59 This passive income allows Americans with the 
ability to save to get wealthier, while leaving those Americans with depressed 
real wages to struggle to meet their basic expenses—let alone save money that 
will allow them to begin to grow their own wealth.60 
This inequality has caused America’s middle class to shrink, forcing more 
families into poverty.61 As of 2013, nearly 15% of the population lived below 
the poverty line.62 Income inequality also harms economic growth. It lowers 
productivity, decreases efficiency, and leads to more instability, all of which 
makes recession more likely.63 Part of this dampening in growth stems from the 
social instability correlated with disparate earnings: crime, educational failures, 
substance abuse, mental health issues, and overall lower life expectancy, all of 
 
 54. See Income Inequality in the United States, INEQ., https://inequality.org/facts/income-inequality/ (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/WJT5-EJGX] (reporting on data from the United States Census Bureau 
and University of California, Berkeley). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. (defining income as “the revenue streams from wages, salaries, interest on a savings account, 
dividends from shares of stock, rent, and profits from selling something for more than you paid for it”).  
 58. See Josh Bivens, Inequality is Slowing US Economic Growth, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/secular-stagnation/ [https://perma.cc/PC46-HSMU] (“By far the most important 
driver of this upward redistribution is the growing wedge between economy-wide productivity growth (a measure 
of income generated in an average hour of work in the United States) and hourly pay of typical American workers 
since the mid-1970s.”); Gilman, supra note 40, at 394; Chappell, supra note 41.   
 59. See Bivens, supra note 58, at tbl.1 (disaggregating income based on wages and investments).  
 60. See infra Section II.A (discussing further the connection between passive income and wealth dispari-
ties).  
 61. See Keith Miller & David Madland, As Income Inequality Rises, America’s Middle Class Shrinks, CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 18, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/ 
2014/12/18/101790/as-income-inequality-rises-americas-middle-class-shrinks [https://perma.cc/C6EP-MTPF]  
(noting America’s shrinking middle class); PETER TEMIN, THE VANISHING MIDDLE CLASS: PREJUDICE AND 
POWER IN A DUAL ECONOMY 3 (2017) (“The middle class’s share of total income fell 30 percent in forty-four 
years.”).  
 62. See Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2016) 
(discussing poverty statistics).  
 63. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS 
OUR FUTURE 117 (2012) (reviewing how inequality threatens the United States’ continued growth); see also 
Gilman, supra note 40, at 398–401(detailing the effects of economic inequality); Heather Boushey & Somin 
Park, Fighting Inequality is Key to Preparing for the Next Recession, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 15, 2019, 
4:15 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/fighting-inequality-is-key-to-preparing-for-the-next-recession/ [https:// 
perma.cc/A9EG-8A6J].  
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which impose even more costs on Americans and the economy.64 The American 
dream of upward mobility, which remains a dominant cultural touchstone, even 
if it never fully described socio-economic accession in America, is metamor-
phosing into a nightmare.65 In noting the multiple factors that have set America 
on its current course, economist Peter Temin describes America as having de-
volved into a third-world nation for many of its citizens.66  
Even those with the highest incomes have recognized the ill effects of this 
disparity.67 As self-styled plutocrat and billionaire Nick Hanaur explains: “At the 
same time that people like [me] are thriving beyond the dreams of any plutocrats 
in history, the rest of the country—the 99.99 percent—is lagging far behind. The 
divide between the haves and have-nots is getting worse really, really fast.”68 
Income inequality guts the middle class, rendering people unable to make dis-
cretionary and necessary purchases, potentially triggering economic stagna-
tion.69 As the economy fails, the likelihood of violence increases.70 Even some 
in corporate America are sounding the alarm that falling incomes may hinder 
economic growth.71 
B. Persistent Income Inequality Among Racial and Ethnic Minorities 
Race and ethnicity and income inequality are interrelated.72  Minorities 
have experienced the least growth in income over the past decades.73 For exam-
ple, in 2016, the median income for white Americans was $48,000, while the 
median income for Black Americans was $31,100, meaning Black Americans 
 
 64. See Gilman, supra note 62, at 4 (noting these effects); Bivens, supra note 58 (noting that income ine-
quality “drags on demand growth as consumption grows more slowly”); STIGLITZ, supra note 63, at 117 (noting 
these effects of inequality); MICHAEL D. YATES, THE GREAT INEQUALITY 172 (2016) (providing an overview of 
how income inequality negatively affects nearly every aspect of American’s lives).   
 65. See KWAK, supra note 16 (“Only one in five Americans think that today’s youth will have a better life 
than their parents’ generation—stark skepticism about what for centuries we have been calling the American 
dream.”); LUKE WINSLOW, ECONOMIC INJUSTICE AND THE RHETORIC OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 88–89 (2017); 
JAMIE L. BRONSTEIN, TWO NATIONS, INDIVISIBLE: A HISTORY OF INEQUALITY IN AMERICA ix–x (2016); Eleanor 
Krause & Isabel V. Sawhill, Seven Reasons to Worry About the American Middle Class, BROOKINGS (June 5, 
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2018/06/05/seven-reasons-to-worry-about-the-
american-middle-class/ [https://perma.cc/4JAU-PVQ8] (showing that the rate of upward mobility has declined 
steadily since 1940s, with a brief period of increase in the 1970s).  
 66. See generally TEMIN, supra note 61.   




 68. Nick Hanauer, The Pitchforks Are Coming . . . For Us Plutocrats, POLITICO: MAG. (2014), https:// 
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/the-pitchforks-are-coming-for-us-plutocrats-108014 [https://perma. 
cc/SM7F-RCLA].   
 69. See Miller & Madland, supra note 61. 
 70. See Hanauer, supra note 68.  
 71. See Erik Sherman, Business Leaders Worry About Income Inequality and Revolution, FORBES (Sept. 
9, 2014, 9:49 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2014/09/09/business-leaders-worry-about-in-
come-inequality-and-revolution/#7785ab2021a6 [https://perma.cc/38BP-SNV4].  
 72. Cf. Gilman, supra note 62, at 9 (recognizing the intersections with economic inequality in the context 
of gender).  
 73. See Kochhar & Cilluffo, supra note 18. 
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make about 65% of what white Americans make.74 Assessing entire households, 
the income gap is even larger, with Black households making just over 60% of 
white households.75 This income gap has remained the same, or worsened, since 
1976.76 
The gap has persisted, in large part, because Black Americans are concen-
trated in the low-wage sector.77 Nonetheless, the gap remains, though decreases 
somewhat, across education levels.78 In 2014, the median income of a household 
headed by a college-educated Black American was $82,300, compared to the 
$106,600 median income of a household headed by a college-educated white 
American, a percentage gap of 23%.79 Overall, Black households constitute 13% 
of American households, but make up only 5% of households in the top 5% of 
income.80 
Income gaps among Latinx Americans are similar.81 In 2014, the median 
income of Latinx households was approximately the same as Black households.82 
The disparity in income between Latinx and white households likewise has in-
creased over the past decades. In 1970, the median income of households headed 
by Latinx Americans was 67% of the median income of white household, as 
compared to 61% of the median income of white households in 2014.83 Similar 
to Black households, Latinx households are 13% of total households in America, 
but comprise 6% percent of those in top 5% of all households.84 
Likewise, in 2017, Native Americans’ household income was 69% of the 
national median household income.85 This places the median income of Native 
 
 74. Id.   
 75. In 2014, the median income of households headed by Black Americans was approximately $43,300, 
while median income of households headed by white Americans was approximately $71,300. On Views of Race 
and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds Apart, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 27, 2016), https://www.pewsocial-
trends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/06/ST_2016.06.27_Race-Inequality-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/546 
M-ELHG]. In 2015, these figures were $44,100 and $75,100, respectively. Kristen Bialik & Anthony Cilluffo, 6 
Facts About Black Americans for Black History Month, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 22, 2017) https://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2017/02/22/6-facts-about-black-americans-for-black-history-month/ [https://perma.cc/ 
DM7X-HBMS].  
 76. On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites are Worlds Apart, supra note 75, at 21–22, 24; 
see also Manduca, supra note 47, at 182 (noting that if not for rapid income growth among white families, the 
income gap between Black and white families would have decreased by about 30%).   
 77. See TEMIN, supra note 61, at 153.  
 78. On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds Apart, supra note 72, at 22.  
 79. Id.  
 80. See Darrick Hamilton & Michael Linden, Hidden Rules of Race Are Embedded in the New Tax Law, 
ROOSEVELT INST. 3 (May 2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-HRR-Tax-Code-
201805.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA9Y-VBA5] (discussing these statistics and noting that the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act, passed in 2018, is likely to exacerbate the racial income gap).  
 81. See Income Inequality in the United States, supra note 54.  
 82. On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds Apart, supra note 75, at 22. 
 83. Id.  
 84. See Hamilton & Linden, supra note 80, at 3.  
 85. See Valerie Wilson, Digging Into the 2017 ACS, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 14, 2018, 4:27 PM), https:// 
www.epi.org/blog/digging-into-2017-acs-income-native-americans-asians/ [https://perma.cc/7EK5-PLH6].  
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American and Alaska Native households slightly below that of Black house-
holds.86 Asian-Americans’ income inequality also is concerning: income ine-
quality in the United States increased the most among Asians from 1970–2016.87 
Asian Americans have displaced Black Americans as the United States’ most 
economically divided group.88 Across these racial and ethnic minorities, unem-
ployment rates generally are higher than those of white Americans, which further 
contributes to persistent income inequality.89 
C. Income Inequality’s Contribution to the Widening Wealth Gap 
Adam Smith warned that “wherever there is great property, there is great 
inequality. For one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor, and 
the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many.”90 The United 
States’ wealth gap is even starker than its wage and income gaps. Since the 
1980s, the top 10% of Americans have amassed roughly 43% of total income 
and other economic growth, which amounts to owning 77% of the “wealth pie.”91 
In contrast, the bottom 10% of the wealth distribution now have average negative 
net worth of owing $2,000.92 The entirety of the bottom 50%, which includes 
roughly 63 million families, owns a mere 1% of the pie.93 This means that Amer-
ica’s top 1% alone has more wealth than the middle class.94 
 
 86. See Dedrick Asante Muhammad et al., Racial Wealth Snapshot: American Indians/ Native Americans, 
NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL. (Nov. 18, 2019), https://ncrc.org/racial-wealth-snapshot-american-indians-
native-americans/ [https://perma.cc/74TV-LU64]; Courtney E. Martin, Closing the Racial Wealth Gap, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/opinion/closing-the-racial-wealth-gap.html 
[https://perma.cc/7D7L-L4K4] (“[N]early 34 percent of Native American children live in poverty (in contrast to 
10 percent of white children)”).  
 87. Kochhar & Cilluffo, supra note 18.  
 88. Id. 
 89. See Unemployment Rate Hits Record Low for Asian Americans, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 5, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/9dc65bd2a3414afead299ef7fb2bc9a1 (noting that Asian Americans’ unemployment rate fell 
in 2019); Valerie Wilson, Black Unemployment is at Least Twice as High as White Unemployment at the National 
Level and in 14 States and the District of Columbia, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.epi.org/pub-
lication/valerie-figures-state-unemployment-by-race/ [https://perma.cc/9756-8L7P]; Janelle Jones, African 
American and Hispanic Unemployment Rates Continue High, AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 15, 2018), https://prospect. 
org/civil-rights/african-american-hispanic-unemployment-rates-continue-high/ [https://perma.cc/RX75-EJJB]; 
Labor Market Trends for American Indians and Alaska Natives, 2000–17, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS. (Nov. 8, 
2018), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2018/labor-market-trends-for-american-indians-and-alaska-natives-2000-
17.htm https://perma.cc/B3NY-FLEP (reporting a 7.8% unemployment rate for Native Americans and Native 
Alaskans in 2017).  
 90. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 766 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1994).  
 91. See Ana Kent et al., What Wealth Inequality in America Looks Like: Key Facts & Figures, FED. RSRV. 
BANK ST. LOUIS: OPEN VAULT BLOG (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2019/august/ 
wealth-inequality-in-america-facts-figures [https://perma.cc/8RPM-WJMV]; Baodong Liu et al., Social Capital, 
Race, and Income Inequality in the United States, 9 SUSTAINABILITY 248, 248 (2017).   
 92. See Signe-Mary McKernan et al., Nine Charts About Wealth Inequality in America, NONPROFIT Q. 
(Mar. 27, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/nine-charts-about-wealth-inequality-in-america/ [https://perma. 
cc/L4AB-AFH7] (reporting based on 2013 figures).  
 93. See Kent et al., supra note 91.   
 94. See Isabel V. Sawhill & Christopher Pulliam, Six Facts About Wealth in the United States, BROOKINGS 
(June 25, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/06/25/six-facts-about-wealth-in-the-united-
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Much of the widening wealth gap accrued after the Great Recession, fueled 
by booming stock markets and a collapse in the housing market, driving the 
haves and have nots further apart.95 The stock market’s contribution to accumu-
lated wealth is a key link between income inequality and wealth inequality.96 
Year after year, the richest Americans experience gains in income that add to 
their wealth, which creates a snowball effect by which their wealth rises expo-
nentially, while more families plummet into poverty.97 
Because of income inequality, wealth inequality is not felt equally across 
all races and ethnicities, even within the same socio-economic groups.98 Com-
pared to income disparities, racial wealth disparities are far greater and genera-
tionally entrenched.99 The median net worth of white households is 1,200% 
higher than Black households.100 One in five Black households has no net worth, 
compared to less than one in ten white households.101 Black households’ wealth 
gap remains even after controlling for education: “White families with a head of 
household who dropped out of high school have more wealth than Black families 
with a head of household who finished college.”102 And as with the wealth gap 
overall, the racial wealth gap increased rapidly after the Great Recession.103 
The wealth gap between white and Latinx households also has remained 
large.104 In 2016, the average white family has over seven times the wealth of 
the average Latinx family.105 Across Black and Latinx households, the wealth 
gap also grows with age. In their 30s, white Americans have an average wealth 
$140,000 higher than Black Americans; in their 60s, white Americans have over 
 
states/ [https://perma.cc/QKJ7-J5L3]; Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States 
Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 
20625, 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20625.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJ46-YNUW] (noting that wealth in-
equality in the US is due almost entirely to the rise of wealth owned by the top 0.1%).  
 95. See Moritz Kuhn et al., Research: How the Financial Crisis Drastically Increased Wealth Inequality 
in the U.S., HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/research-how-the-financial-crisis-drasti-
cally-increased-wealth-inequality-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/9VV9-J46K].   
 96. See Moritz Kuhn et al., Income and Wealth Inequality in America, 1949-2016, at 3 (Apr. 15, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/kuhn/paper/Wealthinequality_April2019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/PC2Z-F4AZ] (linking income and wealth inequality).  
 97. See id.; Kuhn et al., supra note 95 (summarizing research regarding the accrual of stock market gains 
primarily to the wealthy); see also Miller & Madland, supra note 61 (discussing poverty statistics); Gilman, supra 
note 62 (exploring poverty statistics).  
 98. See Rodney E. Hero & Morris E. Levy, The Racial Structure of Economic Inequality in the United 
States: Understanding Change and Continuity in an Era of “Great Divergence”, 97 SOC. SCI. Q. 491, 493 (2016); 
Edorado Ortiz, How Inequality in the US Follows Racial Lines, CHI. POL’Y REV. (May 10, 2019), https://chica-
gopolicyreview.org/2019/05/10/how-inequality-in-the-us-follows-racial-lines/ [https://perma.cc/M2FN-7J6L].   
 99. See Hamilton & Linden, supra note 80, at 3–4.    
 100. See id. at 4.   
 101. See id.   
 102. Id.   
 103. See EDWARD N. WOLFF ET AL., THE DECLINE OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND HISPANIC WEALTH SINCE 
THE GREAT RECESSION (2018) (noting that the gap in net worth between Black and white Americans remained 
the same from 1983 to 2007, but increased thereafter). 
 104. See id. (noting that, in 1983, the median net worth of white households was approximately twenty-six 
times the median net worth of Latinx households and in 2013, the median net worth of white households was 
approximately sixty times the net worth of Latinx households).  
 105. See Kent et al., supra note 91.   
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$1 million more in average wealth than Black Americans.106 The wealth gap nat-
urally links with income inequality. Lower earnings add up over time.107 
Income inequality also links with another main contributor to the wealth 
gap—disparities in homeownership. The more income a family has, the more 
likely that family will own a home.108 Houses are assumed to be the leading ve-
hicle to preserve and grow wealth, and homeownership represents the lion’s 
shares of most families’ wealth.109 Because white Americans are more likely to 
receive inheritance and assistance from their families in the form of down pay-
ments on houses, they often own homes sooner than other Americans, which 
allows white Americans to accumulate wealth faster, adding to racial and ethnic 
disparities in net worth.110 As of 2019, 73% of white Americans owned a home, 
compared to 43% of Black Americans, and 48% of Latinx Americans.111 The 
homeownership rate for Asian Americans is in between these groups, at 59%,112 
and, like most groups, has not budged for decades.113 
 
 106. See McKernan et al., supra note 92; Tyson H. Brown, Diverging Fortunes: Racial/Ethnic Inequality 
in Wealth Trajectories in Middle and Late Life, 8 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 29 (2016) (detailing that, on average, 
white households have a net worth of $105k by midlife, compared to less than $5,000 for Black families and 
$39,000 for Latinx families).  
 107. There is little information about the wealth gap between Native American, Asian American, and other 
households. See Meizhu Lui, Doubly Divided: The Racial Wealth Gap, in WEALTH INEQUALITY READER 42, 42 
(Dollars & Sense & United for a Fair Economy eds., 2008) (“[Native Americans’] poverty rate is 26% compared 
to 8% for whites, even though more than half own their own homes. . . . What we do know is that [Asian Amer-
icans’] poverty rate is 13%, and that 60% of Asian Americans own their own homes, compared to 77% of 
whites.”). 
 108. See Jennifer Rudden, Homeownership Rate in the United States Between 2001 to 2009 and 2010 to 
2017, by Income, STATISTA (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/205440/homeownership-experi-
ence-in-the-us-by-income-group/ [https://perma.cc/J6TU-YCM7].  
 109. See A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a 
Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 189 (2009) (“Home ownership is said to be a fundamental part of the American 
Dream because of the economic security it gives homeowners.”); Kuhn et al., supra note 95 (“[H]ousing booms 
lead to wealth gains for leveraged middle-class households and tend to decrease wealth inequality”); MECHELE 
DICKERSON, HOMEOWNERSHIP AND AMERICA’S FINANCIAL UNDERCLASS: FLAWED PREMISES, BROKEN 
PROMISES, NEW PRESCRIPTIONS (2014) (discussing why the promise of homeownership as part of the American 
dream is flawed, particularly for Black and other minority families).  
 110. See DICKERSON, supra note 109, at 248; Jeffrey P. Thompson & Gustavo A. Suarez, Updating the 
Racial Wealth Gap 3 (Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Working Paper No. 2015-76, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3072923 
[https://perma.cc/4LVM-YQR9] (describing the role of inheritance and family wealth across racial lines); 
Michelle Maroto, Growing Farther Apart: Racial and Ethnic Inequality in Household Wealth Across the Distri-
bution, 3 SOC. SCI.  801 (2016) (detailing the components of wealth inequality, including family structure, edu-
cation, employment, income, and credit usage).   
 111. Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, Second Quarter 2020, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(July 28, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf  [https://perma.cc/ 
9V4P-USLZ].   
 112. Id.  
 113. See McKernan et al., supra note 92 (noting homeownership rates in 1983 and that white American 
homeownership has increased slightly over this period). The homeownership gap persists when adjusted for in-
come and education levels. See Brian J. McCabe, Why Buy a Home? Race, Ethnicity, and Homeownership Pref-
erences in the United States, 4 SOCIO. RACE & ETHNICITY 452, 453 (2018).  
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That Black Americans’ homeownership rates have not increased since the 
1970s may seem perplexing.114 The past decades have brought anti-discrimina-
tion laws aimed at housing, such as the Fair Housing Act,115 along with a con-
certed national effort to transition families from renting to owning.116 The fed-
eral government actively encouraged homeownership, at least outwardly.117 Yet, 
as David Skeel has noted, Black banks have remained consistently undercapital-
ized and open discrimination in mortgage credit markets in New York and Bos-
ton has gone on for centuries.118 
But when considered from America’s history post-slavery, it is predictable 
that Black households did not actually benefit from the government’s outward 
desire to see the wealth gap close.119 America has a deep history of intolerance 
for the accumulation of wealth by Black households.120 The same proved true of 
the homeownership push of the late 1960s through the Great Recession.121 In-
stead of helping Black families build wealth, they became trapped by subprime 
mortgages with high interest rates, redlined into areas where their homes’ value 
was unlikely to appreciate, and forced from their homes when the market 
crashed.122 The next Part focuses on debt inequality and returns to homeowner-
ship as a leading example of how racial and ethnic disparities in access to bank-
ing and credit services deplete the already lower incomes of families of color, 
making it even more difficult to save. Understanding debt inequality’s part in 
 
 114. See Caitlin Young, These Five Facts Reveal the Current Crisis in Black Homeownership, URB. INST: 
URB. WIRE (July 31, 2019), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/these-five-facts-reveal-current-crisis-black-home 
ownership [https://perma.cc/PZ8S-V69V]. 
 115. See generally Jonathan Zasloff, The Secret History of the Fair Housing Act, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
247 (2016) (discussing the passage of the Fair Housing Act and the history of its enforcement).    
 116. See TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 3–4 (noting how the federal government passed laws and policies to 
encourage Black homeownership).   
 117. Id. at 8.  
 118. David A. Skeel, Jr., Racial Dimensions of Credit and Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1694, 
1700–703, 1713–714 (2004).   
 119. See Trymaine Lee, A Vast Wealth Gap, Driven by Segregation, Redlining, Evictions and Exclusion, 
Separates Black and White America, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2019/08/14/magazine/racial-wealth-gap.html [https://perma.cc/9R5P-ECEL]. 
 120. See BARADARAN, supra note 22, at 10–34 (discussing the Freedman’s Savings Bank and the Tulsa 
Race Riots); TEMIN, supra note 61, at x (discussing America’s history of slavery contribution to income and 
wealth disparities); THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, TOXIC INEQUALITY: HOW AMERICA’S WEALTH GAP DESTROYS 
MOBILITY, DEEPENS THE RACIAL DIVIDE, AND THREATENS OUR FUTURE __ (2017) (“[Racial and ethnic wealth 
gaps] have been forged by history and preserved by policy, and only bold, race-conscious reforms can move us 
toward a more just society”).  
 121. See LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK 190, 196 (2011) (noting 
that “in the late 1960s, the federal government sought a way to channel capital into America’s rioting cities . . . 
[s]olving the urban crisis would require solving the housing crisis,” and discussing how the government passed 
laws and established programs to promote homeownership). 
 122. See TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 160; infra Section III.A. Black households also less likely to keep their 
homes if they file chapter 13 bankruptcy, which generally is thought of as the bankruptcy chapter that allows 
people to save their houses. See Rory Van Loo, A Tale of Two Debtors: Bankruptcy Disparities by Race, 72 ALB. 
L. REV. 231 (2009) (finding that Black and LatinX households are less likely to obtain chapter 13 relief); Sara S. 
Greene et al., Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
1031 (2017) (finding that Black households that file chapter 13 are more than twice as unlikely to receive debt 
relief than other households that file chapter 13).    
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feeding the wealth gap is crucial to assessing how law can reverse the wealth gap 
and contribute to achieving racial and ethnic equality.123 
III. DEBT INEQUALITY’S ROLE IN THE DISPARATE ECONOMY 
Not having enough income to meet expenses—that is, economic insecu-
rity—is expensive.124 Along with income inequality, the variety and use of con-
sumer credit products in the United States has risen exponentially since the 
1980s.125 Americans take out mortgages to purchase their houses, student loans 
to finance their education, auto loans to buy their cars, and credit cards and other 
short-term loans to meet daily expenses.126 While these debts can help families 
make large investments, smooth their consumption, and succeed in their quest to 
achieve the American dream,127 income inequality means that more and more 
people turn to high-cost credit products that can trap them in a cycle of debt and 
poverty.128 The hollowing out of the middle class that has come with increased 
income inequality and a widening wealth gap also has driven Americans from 
 
 123. Wealth inequality has a persistently negative effect on socio-economic mobility. See Hamilton & Lin-
den, supra note 80, at 4; SHAPIRO, supra note 120 (following 200 families of different races and income levels 
for over twelve years to discover why some families build wealth while others do not); Cedric Herring & Loren 
Henderson, Wealth Inequality in Black and White: Cultural and Structural Sources of the Racial Wealth Gap, 8 
RACE & SOC. PROBS. 4 (2016) (describing the roles of head of households, bankruptcy, spending patterns, stock 
ownership, business ownership, home ownership, inheritance, education, income, occupation, age, and number 
of children in creating and sustaining the wealth gap).  
 124. See BARADARAN, supra note 8, at 1–10 (discussing how lower-income Americans pay more than oth-
ers for credit and to use their own money); JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC 
INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 12 (2008) (“[E]conomic insecurity . . . is a problem 
faced by a wide swath of Americans . . . Problems once confined to the working poor . . . have crept up the 
income ladder to become an increasingly normal part of middle-class life.”).  
 125. See Andrea Ryan et al., A Brief Postwar History of U.S. Consumer Finance, 85 BUS. HIST. REV. 461, 
465 tbl.1 (2011) (discussing consumer credit products from 1949 through the 2000s); Chris Kirk, Five Charts 
That Show American Families’ Debt Crisis, SLATE (May 12, 2016, 8:01 AM), http://www.slate.com/arti-
cles/business/the_united_states_of_debt/2016/05/the_rise_of_household_debt_in_the_u_s_in_five_charts.html 
[https://perma.cc/3NK8-WAWQ] (relying on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis to show that 
household debt relative to GDP has increased nearly five-fold since 1980). Americans always have used credit 
to meet expenses. Before the rise of credit cards, installment loans, rent-to-own, and other more mainstream 
consumer credit products, people turned to loan sharks. See generally ANNE FLEMING, CITY OF DEBTORS: A 
CENTURY OF FRINGE FINANCE 24 (2018) (detailing loan sharks and other disreputable credit outfits in New York 
in the 1890s); HYMAN, supra note 121, at 44 (detailing consumer credit in the first half of the twentieth century); 
LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 49–50 
(1999) (detailing consumer credit in the first half of the twentieth century); Credit History: The Evolution of 
Consumer Credit in America, FED. RSRV. BANK BOSTON (2004), https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/the-
ledger/2004/spring-summer/spring-summer-2004.aspx [https://perma.cc/9RGV-KKUL] (detailing credit usage 
from the 1800s through the 1960s).  
 126. See Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowley, Household Debt Makes a Comeback in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES: 
DEAL BOOK (May 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/business/dealbook/household-debt-united-
states.html [https://perma.cc/L34N-W79W] (showing data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York detailing 
the breakdown of consumer credit among housing, credit cards, auto loans, student loans, and other).  
 127. See id. (noting that debt “allows Americans to make large investments in education and housing, which 
can help build personal wealth and financial stability.”).  
 128. See LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES xv–xvi 
(2017) (discussing why people turn to alternative financial services). 
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traditional banks and financial products.129 Paying more for credit, such as sub-
prime home and auto loans, short-term financing, such as payday loans, and re-
liance on alternative financial services, such as check cashing outfits, are hall-
marks of the debt inequality that is now part of middle-class life.130 
The increase in American households’ debt loads is telling. In the early 
1980s, the top 5% of American households, based on income, had $0.80 of debt 
per dollar of income, as compared to the bottom 95% of households having $0.60 
of debt per dollar of income.131 By 2007, the top 5% had $0.65 of debt per dollar 
of income, as compared to $1.40 in debt for every dollar of income for all other 
households.132 Stated differently, the bottom 95% of American households saw 
their debt loads almost triple in the span of a few decades.  
As a matter of accessing credit, banking, and other financial services, being 
Black also is expensive. The same is true for Latinx and Native Americans. Re-
search consistently shows that people of color pay more for credit and banking 
services.133 For example, consider the increased costs of using alternative finan-
cial services to access money rather than traditional banks.134 In 2017, 6.5% of 
all households in America were unbanked, meaning they had no bank account, 
and another 18.7% were underbanked, meaning they have bank accounts but still 
use alternative financial services.135 In comparison, 16.9% of Black households 
and 14% of Latinx households were unbanked.136 Just under 13% of “other” 
households, which includes Native Americans, were unbanked. 137  Another 
 
 129. See id.  
 130. See BARADARAN, supra note 8, at 139; Michael Kumhof, Income Inequality Causes Higher Debt Lev-
erage Among All but the Richest Households, and Makes Economies More Vulnerable to Financial Crises, LSE 
U.S. CTR.: USAPP (May 12, 2015), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2015/05/12/income-inequality-causes-
higher-debt-leverage-among-all-but-the-richest-households-and-makes-economies-more-vulnerable-to-finan-
cial-crises/ [https://perma.cc/3JV9-9QT4] (linking debt loads and income inequality).    
 131. See Inequality, Debt and the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2012), https://www.ny-
times.com/2012/05/04/opinion/inequality-debt-and-the-financial-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/4AGC-P75F] 
(overviewing these statistics).     
 132. See id. 
 133. The mechanics behind the increased costs include increased risk and costs to providers and what likely 
amounts to disparate treatment of similarly situated people, forces that are difficult to tease apart. One of this 
Article’s authors has compiled these studies this in her research. See Pamela Foohey, Lender Discrimination, 
Black Churches, and Bankruptcy, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1079, 1096–98 (2017) (overviewing research). Black Amer-
icans also pay more to file bankruptcy, which leads to access to justice issues. Pamela Foohey, Access to Con-
sumer Bankruptcy, 34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341 (2018); Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter 
& Deborah Thorne, “No Money Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055 (2017); see also Andrea Freeman, 
Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 1071 (2017) (noting that credit card companies charge Black 
and Latinx customers more fees and higher interest rates).  
 134. See BARADARAN, supra note 8, at 1–10 (discussing the increased costs of people’s use of alternative 
financial services rather than traditional banks).     
 135. See SERVON, supra note 128, at xvii (defining unbanked and underbanked); Gerald Apaam et al., 2017 
FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households 1 (Oct. 2018), https://www.fdic.gov/house-
holdsurvey/2017/2017report.pdf (reporting 2017 figures). 
 136. Apaam et al., supra note 135, at 3 fig.ES.3.  
 137. Id.; Martha Perine Beard, In Depth: Reaching the Unbanked and Underbanked, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. 
LOUIS (Jan. 1, 2010), [https://perma.cc/HQM9-HJAR] (reporting that the 15.5% of Native Americans are un-
banked). Asian American households have a lower unbanked rate of 2.5%, on par with white American house-
holds’ 3% unbanked rate. Apaam et al., supra note 135, at 3 fig.ES.3.  
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30.4% of Black, 28.9% of Latinx, and 28% of “other” households were un-
derbanked in 2017.138 
In the remainder of this Part, we focus on three examples at the intersection 
of race and ethnicity and debt inequality: home loans, student loans, and payday 
and other alternative financial services. Through these examples, we detail how 
debt inequality compounds income inequality and exacerbates the racial and eth-
nic wealth gaps. In Part IV, we call upon these examples’ lessons to critique 
emerging fintech “innovations” in consumer banking and lending.  
A. Debt Inequality in the Home Mortgage Market 
The promise of the socio-economic benefits of homeownership is central 
to the story of the American dream.139 Instead of reaping rewards from home-
ownership, racial and ethnic minorities instead have fallen prey to sub-prime 
home loans and have experienced the worst of the Great Recession’s housing 
market collapse.140 The rise of federal policies designed to encourage homeown-
ership brought the advent of “nontraditional” mortgage products, including loans 
with high “subprime” interest rates, balloon payments, and relaxed lending re-
quirements.141 Bankers characterized these loans as “affordability” products that 
would help lower-income Americans realize the dream of homeownership.142 In 
reality, many of these products were “toxic.”143 Fueled in large part by an unreg-
ulated securitization market, in the years leading to the housing market’s col-
lapse, their availability skyrocketed.144 
These products were marketed forcefully to prospective Black and Latinx 
homeowners. In 2005 and 2006, about 34% and 36% of all homebuyers, respec-
tively, were sold a nontraditional mortgage.145 Yet around the same time, over 
40% of these subprime mortgages and 25% of refinanced loans were sold to 
 
 138. Apaam et al., supra note 135, at 20 tbl.3.3. Asian American households also have a lower underbanked 
rate of 17.5%, again on par with white American households’ 14.1% underbanked rate. Id. 
 139. See Dickerson, supra note 109, at 189.  
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 109–22.  
 141. See Dickerson, supra note 109, at 196–98 (overviewing these explicit and implicit programs, such as 
tax subsidies).   
 142. See id. at 196–202 (discussing these “affordability products”). 
 143. See id. As David Skeel and others have noted, while access to credit increased, that increased access 
is an expensive double-edged sword. Skeel, supra note 118, at 1723–24. 
 144. See Dickerson, supra note 109, at 203–06 (detailing these rise of “affordability products”); andré doug-
las pond cummings, Families of Color in Crisis: Bearing the Weight of the Financial Market Meltdown, 55 
HOWARD L.J. 303, 304 (2012) (noting the “impact of Wall Street’s fascination with securitizing subprime mort-
gages, creating worthless collateralized debt obligations, and trading these unregulated exotic instruments”); 
JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES: HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE REGULATORS, AND TOXIC 
BANKERS MADE HOME MORTGAGES A THRILLING BUSINESS, at X (2015) (detailing how lax government regula-
tion allowed for the growth of the subprime “toxic” mortgage market); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. 
MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 17 (2011) (discuss-
ing the home loan securitization market). 
 145. See Dickerson, supra note 109, at 203.   
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Black Americans, despite that Black Americans made up just 13% of the popu-
lation.146 Black and Latinx borrowers were more than five times as likely to have 
a subprime mortgage than white borrowers.147 They also were more likely to 
carry subprime mortgages even if they qualify for better, traditional mort-
gages.148 
These subprime and adjustable rate mortgages disproportionally sold to 
Black, Latinx, and other minority borrowers contributed to the Great Reces-
sion.149 They also wiped out what little wealth many minority families had man-
aged to accumulate in homes.150 In Foreclosed, Christopher Odinet details how 
Wells Fargo and other lenders made a point of targeting Black borrowers for 
home loans and refinancing.151 Lenders referred to subprime loans made in mi-
nority communities as “ghetto loans.”152 Some lenders used biblical names to 
attract religious borrowers and even held events at Black churches to try to sell 
the loans as good deals.153 By 2008, 50% of all loans made to Black borrowers 
were subprime and Black borrowers were 2.4 times as likely as white borrowers 
to purchase a subprime loan.154 Again, this was true even though many borrow-
ers were equally creditworthy.155 
That lenders nicknamed these loans “ghetto loans” is telling of how banks 
and real estate agents marketed homeownership to Black and other minority fam-
ilies. As detailed by Mechele Dickerson in Homeownership and America’s Fi-
nancial Underclass and as evidenced by the neighborhood segregation that per-
sists today across America, minorities were steered toward predominately 
minority neighborhoods.156 Homes in these neighborhoods were worth less than 
similar homes in predominately white neighborhoods and were less likely to ap-
preciate in value over time, both of which made it harder for minorities to reap 
 
 146. See Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target 
Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 177–78 (2010).   
 147. See id. at 178; Theresa Singleton et al., Subprime and Predatory Lending in Rural America: Mortgage 
Lending Practices That Can Trap Low-Income Rural People, CARSEY INST. (2006), https://scholars.unh.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=carsey [https://perma.cc/6ZUA-426E] (finding that rural minorities 
are more like than rural whites to take out high APR loans).  
 148. See Orin Bar-Gil & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66 (2008) (noting 
that “minority borrowers are incurring prices on their loans that are higher than is warranted by their credit char-
acteristics.”); Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws to Risk-Based Mortgage 
Pricing, 60 S.C. L. REV. 677, 679–87 (2008) (detailing data pre-Great Recession regarding mortgage rates sold 
to minorities versus white Americans). 
 149. See Johnson, supra note 146, at 181–82; Manuel Adelino et al., The Role of Housing and Mortgage 
Markets in the Financial Crisis, 10 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 25 (2018) (detailing the role of subprime mortgages 
and the inflated housing prices had in the Great Recession).  
 150. See cummings, supra note 144, at 309.   
 151. CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET, FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVING AND THE HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE OF 
HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 21 (2019).  
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 22.  
 155. Id.; see also Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Econom-
ics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1280–297 (2002) (detailing how lenders moved from subprime 
mortgages to even more costly loans). 
 156. See DICKERSON, supra note 109, at 191   
FOOHEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2021  11:16 PM 
No. 2] FINTECH’S ROLE IN THE WEALTH GAP 479 
the wealth rewards of homeownership.157 Likewise, even when Black and other 
minority families live in predominately white neighborhoods, their homes are 
often worth less.158 In addition, because Black and other minorities carried sub-
prime loans, more of their monthly mortgage payments went to paying accrued 
interests and fees than principal, which hindered wealth building.159 
The effects of location and loan prices meant that Black and Latinx home-
owners entered the Great Recession with 13% more mortgage debt than compa-
rable white homeowners.160 They also had accrued 26% less equity in their 
homes as compared to similar white homeowners.161 Once the recession hit, 
Black and Latinx homeowners witnessed their property values decrease by 20%, 
as compared to the 13% decrease experienced by white homeowners.162 In part 
because of their higher use of subprime loans, Black and Latinx families’ homes 
also were disproportionately foreclosed upon by their lenders, which served to 
destabilize home values in predominately minority neighborhoods even more.163 
The ultimate result was that the collapse of the housing market obliterated the 
vast majority of Black and Latinx families’ wealth, much more so than white 
families.164 
There are three key takeaways from the story of debt inequality in the home 
mortgage market. First, the government played a large role in promoting home-
ownership through policies and laws, while simultaneously allowing the sub-
prime mortgage and securitization markets to grow exponentially in a short pe-
riod of time.165 These factors made it economically tenuous for Black Americans 
and other minorities to purchase homes.166 Second, debt inequality exacerbates 
the racial wealth gap. High foreclosure rates, fueled by the higher incidence of 
subprime loans, eliminated most of the wealth gains that Black and Latinx fam-
ilies managed to achieve in the preceding decades.167 Given that white Ameri-
cans saw gains from homeownership over the same period, the debt inequality 
 
 157. See id. at 188–90 (discussing home price disparities).  
 158. See id.; Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Integration: Mixed-Income Housing as Discrimina-
tion Management, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1140, 1140 (2019) (arguing that mixed-income housing, designed to facil-
itate racial and economic integration, replicates race and class assumptions).   
 159. See DICKERSON, supra note 109, at 191–92 (discussing the impact of subprime loans on wealth accu-
mulation); TAYLOR, supra note 22 (discussing how the promise of homeownership failed Black and Latinx Amer-
icans).  
 160. DICKERSON, supra note 109, at 192.  
 161. See id.  
 162. See id. (overviewing these figures).   
 163. See id. at 192–93 (“Two years after the recession ended, approximately 25 percent of Latin[x] and 
[B]lack homeowners had either lost their homes to foreclosure or were seriously delinquent on mortgage loans 
that were approved between 2004 and 2008, while only 12 percent of white homeowners had lost their homes or 
were seriously delinquent.”); Johnson, supra note 146, at 181–82 (discussing the neighborhood effects of fore-
closure).   
 164. See DICKERSON, supra note 109, at 193–94; LINDA E. FISHER & JUDITH FOX, THE FORECLOSURE ECHO: 
HOW THE HARDEST HIT HAVE BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY 2 (2019) (discussing the effects of 
foreclosure on home prices and on wealth building).   
 165. See DICKERSON, supra note 109, at 264–65 (noting these dynamics).   
 166. See id. at 264.  
 167. See id. at 192–94.  
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also may have transferred wealth from minority to other households.168 Third, 
communities of color still face debt inequality when taking out home mort-
gages.169 A 2018 study found that Black and Latinx families are denied mortgage 
loans at higher rates than similarly situated white families, meaning they likely 
continue to face discrimination in mortgage lending.170 
B. Debt Inequality in the Student Loan Market 
Education also is part of the American dream. Across racial and ethnic 
groups, higher education generally confers economic and social benefits, and 
brings lower rates of unemployment and higher incomes.171 Because the cost of 
college has skyrocketed in recent decades, parents and students have turned to 
public (federal and state governments) and private student loans to finance the 
cost of education.172 In 2016, 69% of all graduates left school with student loans, 
which averaged $29,650.173 By comparison, in 1996, 58% of students graduated 
with student loans, which averaged $12,750.174 Americans now owe $1.5 trillion 
in student debt, more than double what they owed a decade ago.175 
A key factor in the increase of incurrence and amount of student loans is 
the emergence and growth of private educational institutions. In 2016, 66% and 
68% of graduates from public and nonprofit colleges had student loans, averag-
ing $26,900 and $31,450, respectively.176 In comparison, 83% of graduates from 
for-profit colleges had student loans, averaging $39,900.177 
As with homeownership, the loans that Black students take out to finance 
this part of the American dream decrease their ability to accumulate wealth.178 
Black students are more likely to take out loans, are more likely to pay more for 
those loans, and are more likely to attend for-profit colleges.179 Focusing again 
 
 168. See id. at 191–92.   
 169. See id. at 192.  
 170. Aaron Glantz & Emmanuel Martinez, Kept Out: For People of Color, Banks Are Shutting the Door to 
Homeownership, REVEAL (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.revealnews.org/article/for-people-of-color-banks-are-
shutting-the-door-to-homeownership [https://perma.cc/V8C2-S9DS]. 
 171. See Osamudia R. James, Predatory Ed: The Conflict Between Public Good and For-Profit Higher 
Education, 38 J. COLL. & U. L. 47, 64 (2011) (overviewing these benefits).  
 172. See Christopher Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1625–28 (2019) 
(overviewing the student loan market); Jonathan Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CAL. L. 
REV. 1561, 1575–79 (2015) (discussing the rise in student loans).  
 173. See Quick Facts About Student Debt, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS (April 2019), https://ti-
cas.org/files/pub_files/qf_about_student_debt.pdf [https://perma.cc/WRT8-G3V7].  
 174. See id.  
 175. See Anthony Cilluffo, 5 Facts About Student Loans, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACTTANK (Aug. 13, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/13/facts-about-student-loans/ [https://perma.cc/RPT8-WDPD]. 
 176. Quick Facts About Student Debt, supra note 173. 
 177. See id.  
 178. See Louise Seamster & Raphaël Charron-Chénier, Predatory Inclusion and Education Debt: Rethink-
ing the Racial Wealth Gap, 4 SOCIAL CURRENTS 199, 199 (2017).  
 179. See id. at 199–200 (explaining that the growth in educational debt among people of color resulted from 
“predatory inclusion,” in which lenders offered loans to Black households on exploitative terms); Ben Miller, 
New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American Borrowers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 
16, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2017/10/16/ 
440711/new-federal-data-show-student-loan-crisis-african-american-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/2R38-26YB]. 
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on 2016 data, 85% of Black students graduate college carrying loans, as com-
pared to 69% of white students, 66% of Latinx students, and 45% of Asian stu-
dents.180 Their loan balances also are significantly higher: $34,000, on average, 
as compared to the $30,100 owed by white students and the $25,450 owed by 
Latinx and Asian students.181 A Brookings Institute study from 2016 likewise 
found that Black students owed more on their federal undergraduate loans four 
years after graduation than they did immediately upon graduation, a result caused 
by negative amortization.182 In comparison, the same study found that only 17% 
of white students saw their loans rise during that four-year period post-gradua-
tion.183 
Nearly half of Black students, overall, default on their loans.184 The percent 
is even higher, two-thirds, for Black students holding loans to pay for education 
at for-profit colleges.185 In comparison, the default rate is 21% for white students 
and 36% for Latinx students.186 Debt to finance education at for-profit institu-
tions similarly hits Latinx students harder than white students. Latinx students 
are more likely to drop out of those institutions, which impacts their earnings 
potential and ability to pay educational debt.187 
The consequence of debt inequality in the student loan market is that Black 
students, in particular, carry a larger than proportionate share of the increasing 
costs of a higher education, so much so that the current student loan system has 
been called “a crisis for African American borrowers.”188 Student loan debt im-
perils the ability of families to save money, purchase homes, and otherwise begin 
 
 180. See Quick Facts About Student Debt, supra note 173. Asian-American students’ loan loads may be 
lower because they have the highest unmet financial need. See Mythili Sampathkumar, Asian-American College 
Students Have Highest Amount of Unmet Financial Need, Study Finds, NBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019, 7:36 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/asian-american-college-students-have-highest-amount-unmet-
financial-need-n961476 [https://perma.cc/4282-BN2G].  
 181. See Quick Facts About Student Debt, supra note 173; Miller, supra note 179.  
 182. Judith Scott-Clayton & Jing Li, Black-White Disparity in Student Loan Debt More Than Triples After 
Graduation, BROOKINGS (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/black-white-disparity-in-student-
loan-debt-more-than-triples-after-graduation/ [https://perma.cc/G225-UCCJ].  
 183. Id. Latinx students also see their student loan balances fall as they pay post-graduation. See Miller, 
supra note 179.  
 184. See Miller, supra note 179.   
 185. See id.  
 186. See id. at tbl.4. The default rate is also lower for white and Latinx students with loans to finance their 
education at for-profit colleges. See id. at tbl.5.  
 187. See Quicksand: Borrowers of Color & the Student Debt Crisis, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 8–9 
(Sept. 2019), https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl-quick-
sand-student-debt-crisis-jul2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3KX-3F7U] (discussing outcomes for Latinx students 
with loans). There is a dearth of information about educational outcomes and loans for Native American students. 
See Francie Diep, Why Student Loans Don’t Work for Native American Students, PAC. STANDARD (June 14, 
2017), https://psmag.com/news/why-student-loans-dont-work-for-native-american-students [https://perma.cc/ 
EC42-SCQB] (discussing what little data exists).   
 188. Ben Miller, Who Are Student Loan Defaulters, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 14, 2017, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/2017/12/14/444011/student-loan-de-
faulters/ [https://perma.cc/2GGJ-D8QK]; see also Dalié Jiménez & Jonathan Glater, Student Debt Is a Civil 
Rights Issue: The Case for Debt Relief and Higher Education Reform, 55 HARV. CIV. RTS. CIV. LIBERTIES L. 
REV. 131 (detailing how “student indebtedness works systematically to disadvantage those students who belong 
to groups historically subordinated on the basis of race”).  
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to accumulate wealth.189 Debt inequality in the student loan market further rein-
forces existing social stratification and contributes to the inheritance of racial 
economic disparities across generations.190 A recent study showed that 5% of 
the mean wealth gap between Black and white households can be explained by 
their differing use of student loans.191 Stated simply, student loans have become 
yet another instance of racial and ethnic inequality in contemporary consumer 
debt markets.192 
C. Debt Inequality in the Payday and Other High-Cost, Short-Term Loan 
Markets 
The “fringe economy”—payday and other short-term loans—is perhaps the 
best-known market for consumer debt built partly on racial and ethnic disparities 
in the need for credit.193 Research has shown that more than 75% of Americans 
live paycheck-to-paycheck and nearly 40% of Americans cannot cover a $400 
emergency expense with cash, savings, or a credit card paid off within a 
month.194 Many of these people also are unbanked or underbanked.195 To cover 
daily expenses, such as food and utilities, every year, about 30 million Americans 
will turn to payday and other high-cost loans marketed as short-term stopgaps.196 
Despite being the most financially vulnerable, these Americans spend the most 
for access to credit to meet their everyday expenses.197 For instance, they spend 
$3.4 billion in fees per year on payday loans alone.198 
 
 189. See Venoo Kakar et al., Does Student Loan Debt Contribute to Racial Wealth Gaps? A Decomposition 
Analysis, 53 J. CONSUMER AFFS. 1920, 1922–24 (2019) (discussing these studies). 
 190. See Jiménez & Glater, supra note 188, at 7–8.   
 191. Kakar et al., supra note 189, at 1922.   
 192. In response to the private student loan market, lenders are using non-traditional data to make lending 
decisions. These lenders promise to deliver lower-cost, better tailored credit to students, with the potential for 
improving lending outcomes, allowing Black and other minority students to better reap the benefits of education. 
See Odinet, New Data, supra note 172, at 1619–21.  
 193. See Christopher K. Odinet, Payday Lenders, Vehicle Title Loans, and Small-Value Financing: The 
CFPB’s Proposal to Regulate the Fringe Economy, 133 BANKING L.J. 263, 263, 265–68 (2015) (defining “fringe 
economy”).  
 194. Emmie Martin, The Government Shutdown Spotlights a Bigger Issue: 78% of US Workers Live 
Paycheck to Paycheck, CNBC (Jan. 9, 2019, 10:39 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/09/shutdown-high-
lights-that-4-in-5-us-workers-live-paycheck-to-paycheck.html [https://perma.cc/R34L-CUXF]; Report on the 
Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2018, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS. (May 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-report-economic-well-being-us-households-201905.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G497-75JG]; see also Foohey et al., supra note 30, at 136 (detailing more recent studies about 
Americans’ little savings).    
 195. See supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.  
 196. See Odinet, supra note 193, at 265; Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where They Borrow, 
and Why, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 5 (July 18, 2012), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-
visualizations/2012/payday-lending-in-america [https://perma.cc/YP4B-R9ZR] (finding that 69% of payday loan 
customers use the loan to cover recurring expenses).  
 197. See Nathalie Martin, Regulating Payday Loans: Why This Should Make the CFPB’s Short List, 2 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 44, 44–45 (2011).  
 198. See Anand Giridharadas, Want a Steady Income? There’s an App for That, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/magazine/want-a-steady-income-theres-an-app-for-that.html [https:// 
perma.cc/S329-CVC4].  
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Payday loans (and newer, but similarly high-cost installment loans) are the 
most common fringe products.199  There are more payday lending outlets in 
America than there are McDonalds or Starbucks.200 Payday loans require bor-
rowers to have a paycheck against which to borrow, usually around $100 to $500, 
with a typical term of a week to a month.201 Borrowers also give lenders access 
to their bank accounts or postdated checks, against which lenders charge interest 
and fees.202 Payday loans are marketed as temporary, short-term loans, and, as 
such, lenders state that they depend on high-volume and relatively high interest 
rates to make any profit.203 Nonetheless, most payday loans are rolled-over at 
least once, the average payday loan customer remains indebted for 55% of the 
year, and 90% of payday lenders’ profits are made from borrowers with a se-
quence of five or more loans per year.204 
Because customers roll over the loans, stating interest rates in annual terms 
is most accurate. Typical payday loans’ fees and fees for high-cost installment 
loans interests equate to 400% to over 1,100% annual percentage rates 
(“APRs”).205 These interest rates and fees, combined with roll-overs, amount to 
paying an average of between $500 and $600 in interest per loan, equaling about 
36% of a borrower’s pretax paycheck.206 Stated differently, payday loan custom-
ers use more than a third of their income to repay payday loans, ultimately paying 
more in fees than the original loan amount.207 Payday lenders are analogized to 
loan sharks with good reason.208 
The federal government has played a key role in allowing payday loans’ 
annual interest rates to remain high. Although usury laws historically were im-
portant to state and federal governments, the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in 
Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha Service Corp. created an unregulated 
 
 199. See Odinet, supra note 193, at 266; Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A 
Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564 (2010) (noting the growth of the 
industry); Caroline Malone & Paige Marta Skiba, Installment Loans, 1–2 (Vand. U. L. Sch., Working Paper 
No.20-04, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3497095 [https://perma.cc/ZA7M-WTAE] (describing installment 
loans, noting that lenders typically charge an APR of 125% for these loans, and concluding that “installment 
loans may cause additional financial strain rather benefits to consumers.”).  
 200. See There Are More Payday Lenders in U.S. Than McDonald’s, NBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014, 2:16 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/there-are-more-payday-lenders-u-s-mcdonalds-n255156 
[https://perma.cc/52EJ-ZKCX]. 
 201. Odinet, supra note 193, at 266.   
 202. See id. at 275; BARADARAN, supra note 8, at 111. 
 203. See Odinet, supra note 193, at 266. 
 204. See BARADARAN, supra note 8, at 111–12 (overviewing these statistics); Martin, supra note 199, at 
573–76 (detailing the importance to payday lenders of repeat customers); Kathleen Burke et al., CFPB Data 
Point: Payday Lending, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 4 (Mar. 1, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3274836 
[https://perma.cc/Z2WS-NTG2] (overviewing similar statistics).  
 205. See BARADARAN, supra note 8, at 112; Martin, supra note 199, at 564–65 (discussing lenders in New 
Mexico).   
 206. See BARADARAN, supra note 8, at 112; SERVON, supra note 128, at 81–83 (describing payday loans).  
 207. See Payday Loan Facts and the CFPB’s Impact, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 14, 2016), https:// 
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2016/01/payday-loan-facts-and-the-cfpbs-impact 
[https://perma.cc/39JP-N9F7].  
 208. See Robert Mayer, Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate Caps, and Deregulation, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807, 
809 (2012) (comparing loan sharks and payday lenders); Martin, supra note 199, at 577 (concluding that “the 
debt trap is the business plan” of payday lenders).  
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regime that payday loan providers have exploited to maintain high APRs.209 
Some states, cities, and small municipalities have enacted local legislation, but 
with the proliferation of online payday loan outlets and other loopholes, federal 
regulation is needed to tamp down on high interest rates.210 Prior to the 2016 
election, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), which is tasked 
with consumer protection in the financial sector, entered the regulatory fray.211 
But even if it was to regulate payday loans in the future, the CFPB does not have 
the ability to set interest rates, which is left to Congress.212 The only context in 
which Congress has regulated interest rates is loans made to military personnel 
via Military Lending Act (“MLA”), enacted in 2007, which places a 36% interest 
rate cap on consumer loans.213 Most recently, Representative Maxine Waters, 
chairwoman of the House Financial Services Committee, stated that in the 2020 
session, she will advance a bill to impose a limit on interest rates which will 
extend the MLA to all Americans.214 
The demographics of payday loan customers reflect the demographics of 
income inequality in America, combined with marketing targeted to specific 
communities.215 Payday loan customers have low to moderate incomes and gen-
erally have steady jobs.216 Single women with children, Black Americans, Latinx 
Americans, and recent immigrants are more likely to use payday loans and other 
fringe products than other groups.217 
In California in the 2000s, for example, less than 5% of all adult residents 
eligible for a payday loan, such as because they had a bank account, were Black, 
 
 209. See Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lender”–A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small 
Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 897 (2012); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, 
and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 
1111–22 (2008).  
 210. See Robert N. Mayer & Nathalie Martin, The Power of Community Action: Anti-Payday Loan Ordi-
nances in Three Metropolitan Areas 1 (Jan. 2017), https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1355&context=law_facultyscholarship [https://perma.cc/DAE2-XY4S] (analyzing campaigns in three lo-
cales to enact ordinances that restrict payday lending).   
 211. See generally Odinet, supra note 193. 
 212. See Martin, supra note 199, at 48. 
 213. 10 U.S.C. § 987(b); see Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect 
Civilians from Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649, 649 (2012); Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. 
Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military Towns, 
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 687–89 (2005).  
 214. See Sylvan Lane, House Chairwoman Backs Interest Rate Cap on Payday Loans, HILL (Dec. 20, 2019, 
1:58 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/475511-house-chairwoman-eyes-interest-rate-cap-on-payday-loans 
[https://perma.cc/TL7Y-J7Q7].  
 215. Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where They Borrow, and Why, supra note 196, at 4.   
 216. See BARADARAN, supra note 8, at 115.  
 217. See id. (noting who uses payday loans); Jerzy Eisenberg-Guyot et al., From Payday Loans to Pawn-
shops: Fringe Banking, The Unbanked, and Health, 37 HEALTH AFFS. 429, 430 (2018) (noting who uses payday 
loans); Nathalie Martin, Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: What We Can Learn from the Banking and Credit 
Habits of Undocumented Immigrants, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 989, 1030–31 (2015) (noting that because undoc-
umented immigrants often do not have the regular paycheck or bank account needed for payday loans, they often 
use title loans instead); Amy J. Schmitz, Females on the Fringe: Considering Gender in Payday Lending Policy, 
89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 65, 67–69 (2014) (discussing why women may use payday loans more often than men).  
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yet Black residents made up 18.7% of all borrowers in California.218 A quarter 
of the population in California eligible for a payday loan was Latinx, and yet 
37% of payday borrowers were Latinx.219 In comparison, 44.5% of all residents 
in California eligible for a payday loan were white, but only 36% of payday bor-
rowers were white.220 Similarly, the records of one of the largest Texas-based 
payday lenders showed that 77% of the loans were issued to Black and Latinx 
customers despite these groups comprising only 40% of the population.221 Over-
all, the odds of payday loan usage are 105% higher for Black households than 
other households.222 
Payday lenders understand their customers’ reality and feelings, and lend-
ers expertly play on these realities and feelings.223 Across America, lenders lo-
cate their shops in low-income neighborhoods with high Black and Latinx pop-
ulations.224 Outlets are more common in minority communities even when those 
 
 218. Wei Li et al., Predatory Profiling: The Role of Race and Ethnicity in the Location of Payday Lenders 
in California, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 4 (Mar. 26, 2009), https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/de-
fault/files/nodes/files/research-publication/predatory-profiling.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3ZX-3M9W].   
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Aracely Panameño & Keith Corbett, Wealth Stripping Payday Loans Trouble Communities of Color, 
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 4 (Oct. 2, 2008), https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/ 
files/research-publication/az-payday-communities-of-color-10-2-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS5D-TBP2].   
 222. Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where They Borrow and Why, supra note 196, at 9. Native 
Americans also face financial issues that lead them to turn to payday loans to income smooth. See Nathalie Martin 
& Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Con-
sumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751, 754–55 (2012). Native American tribes also exploit 
sovereign immunity to operate payday loan outfits that offer high APR loans because they circumvent state usury 
laws. See id. at 755 (noting that these outfits often only benefit non-Native Americans). Payday loan companies’ 
partnerships with tribes have come under heightened scrutiny over the past decade. See Kyra Taylor et al., 
Stretching the Envelope of Tribal Sovereign Immunity?: An Investigation of the Relationship Between Online 
Payday Lenders and Native American Tribes, PUB. JUST. FOUND. 4–5 (Nov. 2017), https://www.publicjus-
tice.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/SVCF-Report-FINAL-Dec-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5WS-ZVXB]. 
 223. See generally GARY RIVLIN, BROKE, USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC.: HOW THE WORKING 
POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS (2011) (detailing payday lenders’ business practices). Returning to Good Girls, its 
writers were spot on in crafting dialogue between Ruby Hill and the cashier at a payday loan outfit, where she 
goes to pay all of her and her husband’s loans. See Michelle Patterson, ‘Good Girls’ Recap: ‘One Last Time’, 
CROOKEDLLAMA (May 7, 2019), https://crookedllama.com/good-girls-recap-one-last-time/ [https://perma.cc/ 
EM2U-CPYW]. Ruby lays out six stacks of cash, which she labels as “my principle, my interest, my service fees, 
my dignity, my happiness, and my soul.” Id. As she leaves, the cashier states “I’ll see you next month.” Id. Ruby 
replies “I won’t be coming back,” to which the cashier states “everyone comes back.” Id.; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 2–5.  
 224. See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 100 
(2001) (discussing a study that showed that minority households are significantly more likely to live within a 
mile of such a lender than nonminority households); Delvin Davis, Mile High Money: Payday Stores Target 
Colorado Communities of Color, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 1, https://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl-mile-high-money-aug2017.pdf (Feb. 2018) [https://perma. 
cc/VJ4Q-EWLV] (“Majority-minority areas in Colorado (over 50% African-American and Latino) are nearly 
twice as likely to have a payday store than all other areas . . ..”); Brandon Coleman & Delvin Davis, Perfect 
Storm: Payday Lenders Harm Florida Consumers, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 8 (March 2016), 
https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl_perfect_storm 
_florida_mar2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/56UY-YHDL] (finding that Florida payday lenders are more highly con-
centrated in minority communities even when accounting for income); Li et al., supra note 218, at 2, 10 (finding 
that in California, Black and Latinx households are two and a half times closer to the nearest payday lender than 
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communities are not low income, suggesting that race is a factor in store location 
regardless of income.225 
The presence of payday lenders and other alternative financial service com-
panies like tax refund loans in communities of color does not automatically mean 
people in those neighborhoods will use their products. But these lenders market 
their loans to residents near where they locate their brick-and-mortar stores.226 
They hire celebrities, such as Magic Johnson and Tavis Smiley, to pitch their 
products as beneficial and to frame their companies as trustworthy.227 They also 
hire persons of color to go to Black churches to persuade pastors to argue against 
regulations limiting the loans, offer money for summer camp, and pay finder’s 
fees for new loans.228 
Combined with the propensity of people to shop at places near their homes 
and jobs, people are more likely to use a payday lender when they live near 
one.229 A study recently conducted by one of the authors of this Article found 
that the distance of payday lenders from people’s home addresses is associated 
with a decreased likelihood of payday loan use.230 It further found that increases 
in the density of payday lenders within a mile and a half of the people’s homes 
are associated with an increased likelihood of payday loan use.231 In other words, 
more payday lenders in a neighborhood leads to more use of payday loans.232 
Other prominent players in the fringe economy are pawnshops, rent-to-own 
companies, and title lenders. These lenders extend credit to customers who can 
offer collateral, such as furniture and cars, and who do not necessarily have a 
bank account or the ability to write a postdated check, as required by payday 
 
white households, and that payday lenders are almost eight times as concentrated in neighborhoods with the 
largest shares of Black and Latinx households as compared to white neighborhoods); Uriah King et al., Race 
Matters: The Concentration of Payday Lenders in African-American Neighborhoods in North Carolina, CTR. 
FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 2 (Mar. 22, 2005), https://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-
analysis/rr006-Race_Matters_Payday_in_NC-0305.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQU4-2GD5] (finding similar in 
North Carolina).  
 225. See Li et al., supra note 218, at 14; Davis, supra note 224, at 2.  
 226. See Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target 
Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 167 (2010) (noting marketing).   
 227. See id. at 197–99 (describing a court decision that noted that using minority persons in advertising is 
a way to legitimize loan products as discrimination).   
 228. See id. at 195–96.  
 229. Younghee Lim et al., Nefarious Neighbors: How Living Near Payday Loan Stores Affects Loan Use, 
88 MISS. L. REV. 333, 339 (2019).   
 230. Id. at 364. This study utilized data collected via Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) 
from chapter 7 cases filed in the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. Filers’ home addresses, 
as well their rate of payday loan usage, were culled from the schedules. The authors also gathered payday lender 
locations in the filers’ geographical area. Regression analysis was used to assess payday loan usage, as the de-
pendent variable, as against the Euclidean distance or straight-line distance in miles between the bankruptcy 
filers’ home addresses and the nearest payday lender, and the density of payday loan stores, measured as the 
number of payday lenders within a 1.5-mile radius of the filers’ home addresses. The study also measured four 
community-level control variables—bank distance, bank density, credit union distance, and credit union den-
sity—in a manner consistent with the payday lender distance and density variables. Id. at 358–62.  
 231. Id. at 364–65.  
 232. Id. at 365.  
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lenders.233 These loans come with similarly high interest rates and often high 
default rates.234 Title loans also come with the risk of losing the car or other col-
lateral upon default.235 
As with payday loans, research shows that lower-income individuals, Black 
Americans, and Latinx Americans disproportionately use these other fringe prod-
ucts.236 It does not seem coincidental that both of these groups are more likely to 
be unbanked or underbanked.237 Part of the puzzle of why minorities turn to pay-
day and other fringe lenders is the flight of traditional banks from neighborhoods 
of color. Many bankers have decided that “[p]roviding financial services to the 
poor is fundamentally unprofitable.”238 As a result, banks have moved out of 
lower-income neighborhoods, where communities of color are concentrated, al-
lowing fringe banking to move in.239 
Use of payday and other high-cost, short-term loans are an enduring reflec-
tion of debt inequality among communities of color.240 As with subprime mort-
gages and student loans, they trap customers in a cycle of debt that gets deeper 
and deeper. The income that borrowers could have saved instead goes to mount-
ing interest and fees, further eroding their financial stability and opportunities to 
amass assets.241 
If the growth in the racial and ethnic wealth gaps in America is to be halted 
and reversed, addressing the terms on which communities of color access credit 
must be prioritized. The next Part details and critiques three new innovations in 
consumer banking and lending that promise to provide broader access to banking 
and credit services at “better” terms and that could siphon less income to lenders, 
allowing greater savings and wealth building. These products also could increase 
the wealth gap, demonstrating that they must be designed and regulated with 
 
 233. See Odinet, supra note 193, at 265–67 (discussing these products); Kathryn Fritzdixon et al., Dude, 
Where’s My Car Title?: The Law, Behavior, and Economics of Title Lending Markets, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 
1014–15 (2014) (overviewing the title loan industry); Marieke Bos et al., The Pawn Industry and Its Customers: 
The United States and Europe 4–7 (Vand. U. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-26, Sept. 2012), https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2149575 [https://perma.cc/4R69-RZNZ] (overviewing the pawn industry).  
 234. See Odinet, supra note 193, at 265–67; James P. Nehf, Secured Consumer Credit and the Fringe Bank-
ing Industry, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 20A (J.B. McDonnell ed., 
2005) (overviewing these products); BARADARAN, supra note 8, at 113 (discussing title lender interest and default 
rates). The overall default rate is low for pawning, though most (80% to 90% of) customers default at least once. 
See Bos et al., supra note 233, at 11.  
 235. See Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and Demographic 
Realities in Title Lending, 77 MO. L. REV. 41, 45 (2012).  
 236. See Fritzdixon et al., supra note 233, at 1030–34 (overviewing demographic findings); Martin & 
Longa, supra note 5, at 552 (noting that title lenders are more likely to open stores in “low-income neighborhoods 
with moderate poverty, where a large percentage of the residents are members of racial/ethnic minority groups, 
young or elderly, or recent immigrants.”).  
 237. See Fritzdixon et al., supra note 233, at 1035 (finding that 40% of respondents who used title loans 
likely were unbanked).  
 238. Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 493 (2013) (quoting 
Sow Hup Chan, An Exploratory Study of Using Micro-Credit to Encourage the Setting Up of Small Businesses 
in the Rural Sector of Malaysia, 4 ASIAN BUS. & MGMT. 455, 456 (2005)).  
 239. Id. at 491.  
 240. Id. at 494–95.  
 241. See Younghee Lim et al., Payday Loan Use and Consumer Well-Being: What Consumers and Social 
Workers Need to Know About Payday Loans, 18 J. POVERTY 379, 384 (2014).  
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closing the wealth gap in mind. With this background, Part V sets forth tenets 
that all proposals for building wealth should include to ensure that consumer 
credit does not continue to extract people’s potential savings.   
IV. FINTECH “ADVANCES” IN CONSUMER BANKING AND LENDING 
The fintech sector has exploded in recent years, so much so that it is “her-
alded as the future of finance.”242 For this Article’s purposes, the key aspect of 
fintech is a platform that replaces or enhances “traditional” banking and credit 
services.243 Fintech firms include payment and settlement companies, such as 
Venmo and Square, investment companies, such as Acorns and Betterment, and 
credit firms, which provide loans to individuals and businesses, such as emerging 
private student loan providers and mortgage lenders.244 
This Part details three recent innovations in consumer banking and lending 
that draw on fintech, all of which have been heralded as having the potential to 
change how Americans access financial services. The first, payroll cards, is the 
oldest and is the least connected with the evolving fintech market.245 As the ini-
tial “entry” into the market for credit and banking services for lower-income in-
dividuals, who often also are unbanked or underbanked, the brief discussion of 
payroll cards provides a baseline for the analysis of new products. The second 
and third, wage access programs and auto finance, have emerged in the past cou-
ple years and should be central to discussions about the potential benefits of 
fintech banking and lending. Collectively, these examples show the perils of re-
lying on fintech and similar innovations as the ultimate (and often only) solution 
to debt inequality’s link with income and wealth inequality.   
A. Payroll Cards 
Payroll cards essentially are reloadable gift cards, similar to the cards one 
might purchase at Target, Walmart, or the grocery store that allow the recipient 
 
 242. Odinet, supra note 172, at 1634; see also Odinet, supra note 13, at 783 (defining “fintech”). 
 243. See Odinet, supra note 172, at 1634 (noting that “[f]ounders and advocates breathlessly claim that their 
platforms will change or ‘disrupt’ everything”).  
 244. See id. at 1635 (overviewing the market); Lauren Sanders, Fintech and Consumer Protection: A Snap-
shot, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 2 (Mar. 2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/cons-protection/rpt-fintech-and 
-consumer-protection-a-snapshot-march2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT58-SA4U] (listing fintech products); 
Johnson et al., supra note 13, at 500–02 (discussing fintech financial firms that use learning algorithms); supra 
note 192 and accompanying text.  
 245. Payroll cards nonetheless depend on “technological innovation.” Jennifer Romich et al., A Tool for 
Getting By or Getting Ahead? Consumers’ Views on Prepaid Cards 3 (Networks Fin. Inst., Working Paper No. 
2009-WP-09, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1491645 [https://perma.cc/3W2L-86KJ].  
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to spend the loaded amount at any retailer that accepts Mastercard, Visa, or sim-
ilar.246 That is, they are debit cards.247 They are marketed to employers as alter-
natives to the costly process of issuing paper paychecks to employees who do 
not have bank accounts and thus cannot get direct deposits.248  
Unbanked and underbanked employees typically take paper checks to 
check-cashing outfits, which subtract high fees and costs from the check amounts 
for their services, leaving employees with about 95% of their paychecks.249 In-
stead of issuing paper checks, employers can load an employee’s wages onto a 
payroll card, which the employee then can use like a debit or credit card, saving 
employees check-cashing fees.250 Payroll cards can be thought of as precursors 
to digital money transfer services like Venmo, but without the attached bank ac-
counts that Venmo and similar services require.251 Payroll cards are estimated to 
save employers between $2.87 and $3.15 per payment,252 and at first glance 
seem like a win-win for employers and employees.  
For the purposes of this Article’s analysis of emerging fintech innovations 
in banking and lending, it is useful to review the problems that employees have 
reported with payroll cards and how payroll cards may inhibit people’s entry into 
mainstream banking. Payroll cards bring heightened expenses and risk of loss for 
employees. Most payroll cards come with usage fees that deplete employees’ 
wages, perhaps even more so than check-cashing fees.253 These fees include the 
expected point-of-sale fees and ATM fees, as well as monthly maintenance fees, 
“denied transaction fees,” “check your balance fees,” fees for calling customer 
service, and “overdraft” fees.254 For instance, a 2014 New York study found that 
 
 246. Id.   
 247. See Claes Bell, The Problem with Payroll Cards, BANKRATE (July 17, 2013), https://www.bank-
rate.com/financing/banking/the-problem-with-payroll-cards/ [https://perma.cc/5Y42-DQ3V]; Romich et al., su-
pra note 245, at 3–4.  
 248. See Bell, supra note 247.  
 249. See Beard, supra note 137 (“Unbanked consumers spend . . . between 4 percent and 5 percent of payroll 
check just to cash them.”); Joseph J. Doyle et al., How Effective Is Lifeline Banking in Assisting the ‘Unbanked’?, 
4 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1, 1 (June 1998), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/re-
search/current_issues/ci4-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A76-4GH3] (overviewing how much an employee would save 
if they were banked).    
 250. See James J. Angel & Douglas McCabe, The Ethics of Payments: Paper, Plastic, or Bitcoin? 132 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 603, 608 (2015) (discussing major employers using payroll cards); Suzanne Martindale & Christina 
Tetreault, Pay Me How? What You Should Know About Payroll Cards, 48 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. OF POVERTY 
L. & POL’Y 69, 69–70 (2014).   
 251. See Johnson et al., supra note 13, at 501 (noting these services).  
 252. See Regulation of Payroll Card Accounts: A Guide for Policymakers (With Model Payroll Card Leg-
islation), AM. PAYROLL ASS’N (Feb. 2018), https://info.americanpayroll.org/pdfs/gov/GRTF-paycard-Reg-
Payroll-Card-Accounts-APA-201802.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5H3-CBY5].  
 253. See Martindale & Tetreault, supra note 250, at 69–70.   
 254. See id. at 70 (overviewing fees); Pinched by Plastic: The Impact of Payroll Cards on Low-Wage Work-
ers, N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN.: LAB. BUREAU 6 (June 2014), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Pinched%20by%20Plastic.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2UDU-AL7L] (finding that almost all payroll card programs charged fees for card-related ac-
tivities); Dana Dratch, It Pays to Know These 5 Things About Payroll Cards, CREDITCARDS.COM (Aug. 27, 2013), 
https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/payroll_cards-fees-employer-1271.php [https://perma.cc/47W6-
8P8C] (noting that some issuers “offer what they call ‘balance protection’ or ‘overdraft protection,’ to let trans-
actions go through when there isn’t enough money in the account to cover them,” which costs upwards of $25 
per incident).  
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payroll card fees averaged between $15.00 per employee per year to $20.00 per 
employee per month. 255  The report notes that “[f]or a minimum wage 
worker . . ., $20.00 was equivalent to almost three hours of work per month.”256 
Payroll cards also can result in employees not having access to paystubs, 
which provide information on hours worked, tax withholdings, and expense re-
imbursement.257 In addition, payroll cards discourage bank relationships, which 
are thought to be one of the entry points to the middle class.258 A banking rela-
tionship allows for easy, low-cost access to one’s own money, encourages sav-
ing, and builds wealth.259 An employer that relies on paper checks and direct 
deposits necessarily encourages employees to consider opening a checking ac-
count. Payroll cards, in contrast, may steer employees away from mainstream 
banks, exacerbating their reliance on high-cost fringe banking and credit.  
Indeed, increased “use of payroll cards has paralleled the decline of other 
traditional financial products,” particularly among the unbanked and un-
derbanked. 260  Approximately 3.2% of unbanked and 4.2% of underbanked 
households used payroll cards in 2009.261 By 2011, these percentages had in-
creased to 5.5% and 5.3%, respectively.262 Every year, employers load more 
wages onto payroll cards. In 2012, U.S. employers loaded $34.1 billion onto pay-
roll cards.263 By 2017, the industry expected that amount to nearly double to 
$68.9 billion.264 Overall, roughly 12 million Americans use a prepaid card every 
month, many (but not all) of which are payroll cards provided by employers.265 
Among the unbanked and underbanked, demographically, the most likely users 
of payroll and prepaid cards are Black Americans.266 
 
 255. Pinched by Plastic: The Impact of Payroll Cards on Low-Wage Workers, supra note 254, at 9.  
 256. Id. 
 257. Martindale & Tetreault, supra note 250, at 71.   
 258. Id. at 69.   
 259. Benefits of a Bank Account, WESTCHESTER, https://www.consumer.westchestergov.com/financial-ed-
ucation/money-management/benefits-of-a-bank-account (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6SJF-
NHEB]; cf. Bell, supra note 247.  
 260. Martindale & Tetreault, supra note 250, at 69.  
 261. Id. at 70. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Dratch, supra note 254.  
 264. See U.S. Payroll Card Programs: Paving the Path for New Revenue, AITE GROUP (Feb. 22, 2013), 
https://www.aitegroup.com/report/us-payroll-card-programs-paving-path-new-revenue [https://perma.cc/8CJT-
Z9LY].  
 265. Why Americans Use Prepaid Cards: A Survey of Cardholders’ Motivations and Views, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS 1 (Feb. 2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2014/ 
prepaidcardssurveyreportpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/58M7-NMPS]. 
 266. Banking on Prepaid: Survey of Motivations and View of Prepaid Card Users, PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS 4 (June 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/06/bankingonprepaidreport.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Y3G7-857R] (finding that, in the unbanked category of prepaid card users, 42% were white, 32% were 
Black, 16% were Latinx, and 10% were defined as another race/ethnicity.) In the banked category of prepaid card 
users, 60% were white, 15% were Black, 16% were Latinx, and 9% were other race/ethnicity. Id. 
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The world of payroll cards and prepaid cards more generally has been re-
ferred to as “the wild, wild west of finance.”267 Some federal and state regula-
tions apply to payroll cards. These rules generally speak to educating people 
about cards’ fees, and thus have not prevented these cards from being criticized 
as detrimental to people’s savings.268 Payroll cards receive the same protections 
as debit cards under the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation E, implementing 
the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, which requires disclosure of fees, limitations 
on liability, and protections from fraud.269 Federal law also provides that em-
ployees cannot be forced to accept payroll cards.270 About half of the states have 
enacted some sort of regulation dealing with payroll cards.271 A majority of these 
regulations provide enhanced protections for employees receiving their wages 
via payroll cards.272 
Most recently, the CFPB, which has jurisdiction over Regulation E, enacted 
additional rules that mainly require disclosures and limit fees.273 Despite these 
regulations, including one requiring that employers who use payroll cards offer 
at least one alternative to employees for getting paid, worries remain.274 Because 
low-wage workers are at-will employees, they have an incentive to heed employ-
ers’ suggestion that employees “choose” the payroll card option.275 This will 
contribute to keeping these consumers out of mainstream banking, inhibit sav-
ings, and ultimately further widen the wealth gap.  
 
 267. Dana George, The (Mostly) Bad News About Prepaid Cards, ASCENT (Sept. 22, 2019), https://www. 
fool.com/the-ascent/credit-cards/articles/the-mostly-bad-news-about-prepaid-cards/ [https://perma.cc/7VN7-
WVSD]. 
 268. Id.; Heather Morton, Regulating Payroll Cards, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURE: LEGISBRIEF (July 
2015), https://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/regulating-payroll-cards.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/6XT8-3Q4J].   
 269. See Morton, supra note 268 (detailing these regulations); Martindale & Tetreault, supra note 250, at 
71–72 (describing federal laws applicable to payroll cards). 
 270. See Martindale & Tetreault, supra note 250, at 72. 
 271. Morton, supra note 268.   
 272. See id. (overviewing the state of regulation as of 2015); Martindale & Tetreault, supra note 250, at 73 
(describing state laws applicable to payroll cards). 
 273. See Summary of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Prepaid Card Rule, NAT’L CONS. L. 
CTR., https://www.nclc.org/issues/summary-of-cfpb-prepaid-card-rule.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https:// 
perma.cc/U2W9-PT7N] (summarizing the new rules); Prepaid Accounts under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 
(Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.con-
sumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/rulemaking/final-rules/prepaid-accounts-under-electronic-fund-transfer-
act-regulation-e-and-truth-lending-act-regulation-z/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/B7QZ-76MW].  
 274. Morton, supra note 268.   
 275. Scholars have critiqued similar instances of regulation by “nudge” and disclosure that do not benefit 
consumers in the ways the regulations anticipate. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of 
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665 (2011) (concluding that “mandated disclosure repeatedly fails 
to accomplish its ends”); Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1174 
(2013) (arguing that defaults are “slippery” such that businesses can convince consumers to opt into the behavior 
that the default is meant to discourage); Van Loo, supra note 8, at 243–44 (discussing problems with nudges and 
mandatory disclosures as to consumer financial products).   
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B. Early Wage Access Programs 
Early wage access programs are one of the most recent entrants into the 
fintech consumer finance market, first appearing around 2014.276 As detailed by 
Nakita Cuttino and Jim Hawkins in the first scholarly articles to consider the 
potential and pitfalls of early wage access, these programs use online platforms 
to allow employees to access earned but unpaid wages prior to their usual pay-
days.277 These programs claim to be revolutionary alternatives to payday loans 
and other fringe financing, to which employees otherwise may turn in order to 
deal with shortfalls in income.278 Instead of paying fees and interest on loans 
people use to smooth their income, early wage access programs charge per-use 
or monthly subscription fees.279 
Understanding how these programs work behind-the-scenes is critical to 
assessing whether these programs are as revolutionary as claimed. Program pro-
viders either partner with employers for access to payroll and time-entry data or 
ask for similar data, such as mobile location tracking for Uber drivers, from em-
ployees.280 From these data, providers calculate accrued wages.281 To access 
their wages, as of now, employees are offered four different fees structures. Per 
transaction fees range from $1.99 to $5.00.282 Per pay period fees, such as bi-
weekly, are about $5.283 Monthly subscriptions fees range from $6 to $8.284 
Some employers, such as Walmart, will cover employees’ fees for a set, limited 
number of annual transactions.285 And some services allow users to “tip,” with 
 
 276. Leading wage access programs include PayActiv, DailyPay, and Earnin, each of which was launched 
in 2014 or 2015. See Evolution of Pay, PAYACTIV, https://www.payactiv.com/evolution-of-pay/ (last visited Jan. 
17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/G2MJ-BMH5] (stating that PayActiv launched in 2014); The DailyPay Movement, 
DAILYPAY, https://web.dailypay.com/movement (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/4VM4-L933] (stat-
ing that DailyPay’s first customer signed up in 2015); Sage Lazzaro, This App Promises Easy Cash, But It’s a 
Security Nightmare Waiting to Happen, MEDIUM (Dec. 20, 2018), https://onezero.medium.com/this-app-prom-
ises-easy-cash-but-its-a-security-nightmare-waiting-to-happen-9b5758f91d23 [https://perma.cc/926Y-WXJC] 
(noting that Earnin began as ActiveHours, which launched in 2014); Louis DeNicola, These 8 Apps Can Help 
You Make It to Your Next Payday, MAGNIFY MONEY (May 17, 2019), https://www.magnifymoney.com/ 
blog/banking-apps/these-apps-can-help-you-make-it-to-your-next-payday/ [https://perma.cc/SGS2-5KWQ] 
(listing early wage access apps); Sanders, supra note 244, at 11 (noting apps).    
 277. Nakita Q. Cuttino, The Rise of “Fringetech”: Regulatory Risk in Early Wage Access, 115 NW. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3531798 [https://perma.cc/LBE3-9J7C]; Jim 
Hawkins, Earned Wage Access and the End of Payday Lending, 101 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2021) 
(manuscript at 1); see also Nathalie Martin & Lydia Pizzoni, Shadow Credit and the Devolution of Consumer 
Credit Regulation, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1439, 1485 (mentioning early wage access programs in discussing 
“advances” in rent-to-own).  
 278. Cuttino, supra note 277; Chris Opfer, ‘Early Wage’ Apps Aim to Disrupt Payday Loans, Two-Week 
Cycle, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 1, 2019, 5:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/early-wage-
apps-aim-to-disrupt-payday-loans-two-week-cycle [https://perma.cc/D54G-5JD4].   
 279. See Cuttino, supra note 277 (manuscript at 10–11); Opfer, supra note 278.  
 280. Cuttino, supra note 277 (manuscript at 1–2).    
 281. See id. at 2; Hawkins, supra note 277 (manuscript at 7–12).  
 282. Cuttino, supra note 277 (manuscript at 10). 
 283. Id. (manuscript at 10–11).   
 284. Id. (manuscript at 11).  
 285. Id.  
FOOHEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2021  11:16 PM 
No. 2] FINTECH’S ROLE IN THE WEALTH GAP 493 
suggested tips of $9 for a $100 withdrawal.286 Not tipping, at all or too little, may 
result in the program limiting services.287 
As with payday loans, these fees seem low at first glance. But annualizing 
the fees to interest rates shows that these programs can be as expensive as payday 
loans. For instance, under the tip-based model, for a two-week advance, the $9 
suggestion calculates to an APR over 450%.288 As Cuttino notes, even the most 
“affordable” programs come with fees equivalent to 73% APRs, which is more 
than double the interest rate of most credit cards.289 Similarly, Hawkins calcu-
lates potential APRs as between 390% and 1,200%.290 
Because early wage access programs are so new, there is little information 
about users’ demographics. That the programs are marketed to lower-income in-
dividuals, such as Walmart and Noodles & Company employees, and gig-econ-
omy workers, such as Uber and Lyft drivers,291  suggests that lower-income 
Americans predominately use these programs. Data from program providers, 
such as DailyPay, confirm that the average transfer is $66, further suggesting that 
people are “advancing” themselves small amounts, possibly to meet daily ex-
penses, similar to how payday loan customers use their loans.292 Over 90% of 
DailyPay users report that they use the money to pay their bills on time.293 
How exactly early wage access programs fit within banking and credit reg-
ulation remains unexplored. Providers claim that their programs are money trans-
mission services, not credit products, and thus not loans.294 If the programs are 
 
 286. Id.   
 287. Id. (manuscript at 10–11) (overviewing fee structures); Hawkins, supra note 277 (manuscript at 12–
14).  
 288. See Lisa Rowan, Early Wage Apps Are a Little Too Much Like Payday Loans, LIFEHACKER (Aug. 13, 
2019, 2:00 PM), https://twocents.lifehacker.com/early-wage-apps-are-a-little-too-much-like-payday-loans-183 
7206504 [https://perma.cc/W7NZ-ZVLM] (noting this APR).  
 289. See Cuttino, supra note 277 (manuscript at 12) (calculating interest rates). 
 290. See Hawkins, supra note 277 (manuscript at 30–31) (calculating interest rates). 
 291. See Anneken Tappe, These Companies Are Revolutionizing How People Get Paid, CNN (Nov. 13, 
2019, 11:46 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/13/economy/instant-access-pay-employees/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/US6B-AAWP]; The Employer’s View Of Early Wage Access, PYMTS (July 25, 2019), https:// 
www.pymnts.com/news/b2b-payments/2019/early-wage-access-employers/ [https://perma.cc/X99B-HWEK] 
(noting that “nearly 44 percent of gig workers in the U.S. have received either full or partial advance payment 
for their services—and are willing to pay fees for that advance payment, too”); Tom Groenfeldt, Early Access To 
Wages, A Prized Benefit, Costs Employers Little Or Nothing, FORBES: ENTERPRISE TECH (Apr. 18, 
2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/2019/04/18/early-access-to-wages-a-prized-bene-
fit-costs-employers-little-or-nothing/#7810b5716312 [https://perma.cc/3T7Y-FK9J] (noting that Walmart part-
ners with PayActiv); Kelsey Gee, Workers Get Faster Access to Wages With These New Apps, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
24, 2017, 5:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apps-let-workers-make-every-day-a-payday-1511528400 
[https://perma.cc/M6LL-JNGB] (noting Uber drivers). 
 292. See Karl Pawlewicz, What Are On-Demand Payment Solutions?, DAILYPAY (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://www.dailypay.com/blog/what-are-on-demand-payment-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/8C6Q-T6FX]; supra 
note 196 and accompanying text. 
 293. Meaghan Shields, DailyPay Announces $9 Million in Series B Funding, CISION: PRWEB (Feb. 15, 
2018), https://www.prweb.com/releases/2018/02/prweb15210839.htm [https://perma.cc/UZ7A-XLL5]; see also 
Cuttino, supra note 277 (manuscript at 13) (discussing early wage access program users).  
 294. See Cuttino, supra note 277 (manuscript at 15).   
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not loans, then federal and state lending laws do not apply.295 Even so, regula-
tors, policymakers, and consumer advocates are concerned that these program 
act like loans and should come with usury limits and disclosures applicable to 
short-term, high-cost products, such as the payday loans they seem to replace.296 
As argued by Cuttino, early wage access programs include key features of loans, 
most notably the intertemporal decision-making that comes with taking out 
money for a fee (that is, the time value of money) and the risk that people will 
repeatedly use the apps, leading to a cycle of over-indebtedness similar to that 
created by fringe lending.297 In response, providers argue that their programs can 
bring unrecognized benefits to users, including financial management tools, 
which often come with the programs’ apps.298 
Because they are new, these products are largely unregulated.299 As of Au-
gust 2019, California legislators were considering a bill to cap transaction fees 
charged by early wage access programs.300 This bill recognizes the key concern 
with these programs: that users will end up paying high sums simply to be 
paid.301 As with check cashing and payroll cards, early wage access programs 
have the potential to erode employees’ already slim pay.302 They likewise have 
the potential to steer people away from establishing bank accounts.  
Also, as with other alternative financing products, allowing people to get 
money they have earned before their payday does not solve the income shortage 
that they face. Regardless of how these products are categorized within the cur-
rent banking and lending regulatory structure, like other leading products used 
by lower-income and minority Americans, paying fees to access income chips 
away at the ability to build wealth.303 To the extent that people must access credit 
to smooth necessary consumption and cover unexpected expenses, it is critical 
to ensure that credit products minimize the potential for people to be trapped in 
a cycle of debt. At this time, especially given their unregulated and seemingly 
unclear fee structures, it remains questionable whether early wage access pro-
grams provide this assurance.304 
 
 295. See id. at 15–23.  
 296. See Dan M. Clark, New York Leads Multistate Investigation Into Payroll Advance Industry, LAW.COM: 
N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/06/new-york-leads-multistate-in-
vestigation-into-payroll-advance-industry/?slreturn=20191131094520 [https://perma.cc/V394-X68Q] (reporting 
that New York was launching a nine-state investigation into early wage access programs); Penny Crosman, A 
Payday Lender in Disguise? New York Investigates the Earnin App, AM. BANKER (Apr. 3, 2019, 9:03 PM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/a-payday-lender-in-disguise-new-york-investigates-the-earnin-app 
[https://perma.cc/3E2Q-GTKA]. 
 297. See Cuttino, supra note 277 (manuscript at 24–40) (discussing the lack of transparency and competi-
tiveness that come with these apps); Hawkins, supra note 277 (manuscript at 33–42) (discussing the “uncertain 
status” of early wage programs); supra Section III.C (discussing payday loans and other fringe lending).  
 298. See Sanders, supra note 244, at 11–12 (detailing promises and concerns). 
 299. See Cuttino, supra note 277 (manuscript at 5).   
 300. See Opfer, supra note 26 (discussing California’s legislation); Hawkins, supra note 277 (manuscript 
at 47–49) (reviewing California’s legislation).  
 301. Opfer, supra note 26.   
 302. See supra Section IV.A.  
 303. Id.   
 304. See Cuttino, supra note 277 (manuscript at 41).  
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C. Auto Lending Platforms 
Many people also must use credit to purchase larger ticket, but still essential 
items, such as automobiles. Most Americans need an automobile to get to work, 
get kids to daycare, travel to the doctor, and even to access healthy food.305 Alt-
hough car ownership is lower for Millennials, research shows that going “car 
free” is a not a lifestyle choice for most Americans, but rather an economic reality 
that correlates with poverty and unemployment.306 Most Americans do not own 
their cars outright. Instead, they take out loans, secured by the cars, to finance 
their purchase.307 
As with mortgages and student loans, historically, Black and Latinx Amer-
icans have paid more for their auto loans than other Americans, and also experi-
enced higher rates of loan default and car repossession.308 Native Americans also 
face discrimination in the auto loan market.309 Minorities also are more likely to 
be sold subprime auto loans, which is a growing sector of consumer finance.310 
Indeed, the subprime auto loan sector is growing so rapidly that concerns about 
its stability intensify every quarter with the release of new data about origina-
tions, defaults, and repossessions.311 
Similar to mortgages and student loans, the fintech sector is expanding into 
auto loans.312 Online lenders such as AutoGravity and AutoFi partner with banks 
and other established lenders to pre-qualify customers for auto loans.313 Custom-
ers are invited to shop for a car online, get loan approval, test drive the car, and 
 
 305. See Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless & Deborah Thorne, Driven to Bankruptcy, 55 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 287, 289–90 (2020) (discussing Americans’ use of automobiles).   
 306. See id.  
 307. See id. at 290, n.11 (nothing that two-thirds of Americans purchase automobiles, new and used, by 
taking out loans). 
 308. See id. at 292–93 (overviewing the racial and ethnic demographics of auto loan origination and repos-
session); Johnson, supra note 146, at 183–84 (discussing auto loan fees and added costs).  
 309. See Megan Horning, Border Town Bullies: The Bad Auto Deal and Subprime Lending Problem Among 
Navajo Nation Car Buyers, 73 NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD REV. 193 (2016).  
 310. See Foohey et al., supra note 305, at 292–93; Adam J. Levitin, The Fast and the Usurious: Putting the 
Brakes on Auto Lending Abuses, 108 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1257 (2020) (discussing how the “car loan market is rife 
with abuses” and proposing a way to disaggregate car buying from lending to deal with some of those abuses); 
Alexander W. Butler et al., Racial Discrimination in the Auto Loan Market 2, 4 (June 25, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301009  [https://perma.cc/G4JP-8HHE] (finding that Black and Latinx 
applicants’ auto loan approval rates are 1.5% lower, even controlling for creditworthiness, and that minorities 
pay 70 basis point higher interest rates). 
 311. See Foohey et al., supra note 305, at 292–93; Anjali Kamat, The Other Subprime Debt Problem, 
WNYC News (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.wnyc.org/story/other-subprime-debt-problem/ [https://perma.cc/ 
RZB3-UVNN] (noting that auto debt has increased 75% since the Great Recession).  
 312. See Ryan Lichtenwald, Fintech Firms in Auto Gaining Traction, LENDACADEMY (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.lendacademy.com/fintech-firms-auto-gaining-traction/ [https://perma.cc/5U75-LZPQ]. 
 313. See Sanders, supra note 244, at 13–14 (overviewing fintech auto loans); Matthew DeBord, Fintech 
Continues to Push Into Car Lending as Chase Partners With AutoFi, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 14, 2018, 3:47 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/chase-partners-with-autofi-fintech-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/GH6A-C4WV]. 
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then immediately “buy” it.314 Other platforms, such as Fair and Flexdrive, prom-
ise access to cars without long-term commitments and other costs.315 These plat-
forms likewise partner with traditional banks.316 
These platforms promise to reduce transaction fees, enabling access to 
credit at more competitive terms.317 But, like early wage access programs, these 
platforms may encourage fast decision making and create a disincentive to shop 
around for loans, possibly leading to higher prices, as well as the potential to trap 
users in a cycle of paying to use automobiles without ever moving toward own-
ing those vehicles.318 The rapidity of receiving an auto loan and the delivery of 
documents to consumers via tablets and smartphones could result in people sign-
ing agreements they have not read, let alone understood. Although this can hap-
pen in other circumstances, delivery of key documents on tablets and 
smartphones may particularly impair consumer’s consideration of these auto 
loans’ terms and fees.319 In addition, some platforms market their services first 
and foremost to auto dealers, not loan customers, raising concerns that the dealers 
are their customers, not the auto buyers.320 As a result, the platforms may prior-
itize the welfare of auto dealers over auto buyers.321 
Uber’s now defunct auto loan program—which proceeded under several 
names, including its Vehicle Solutions Program, Uber Xchange Car Financing, 
and Uber Xchange Leasing—illustrates some of the potential pitfalls of fintech 
innovations in consumer lending.322 Through its program, in addition to offering 
 
 314. See AutoFi is Built for Remote Sales, AUTOFI, https://www.autofi.com/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/Z7RA-Z2QM] (marketing the platform as “[a] complete digital retail solution with real-time 
lender decisions”).   
 315. See Sanders, supra note 244, at 13–14 (overviewing fintech auto loans). Some platforms, such as Lend-
ing Club and Finova Financial, offer auto loan refinancing and alternatives to title loans. See Lichtenwald, supra 
note 312. 
 316. See Ally Bank Inks $100MM Debt Facility with Vehicles Fintech Fair, ABL ADVISOR (Aug. 28, 2019, 
8:55 AM), https://www.abladvisor.com/news/16982/ally-bank-inks-100mm-debt-facility-with-vehicles-fintech-
fair [https://perma.cc/EMH9-4DD6]. 
 317. See Sanders, supra note 244, at 13–14; Blend Expands From Mortgages and Consumer Loans Into 
Auto Financing, AUTO FIN. J. (Oct. 29, 2019, 5:18 PM), https://www.autoremarketing.com/autofinjournal/blend-
expands-mortgages-and-consumer-loans-auto-financing [https://perma.cc/S277-BQYD] (discussing a fintech 
company, Blend, that processes $2 billion in mortgage and consumer loans daily that recently decided to enter 
the auto loan market).  
 318. See Sanders, supra note 244, at 13–14 (overviewing promises and concerns with fintech auto loan 
platforms). 
 319. See Shankar Vedantam, Do You Read Terms Of Service Contracts? Not Many Do, Research Shows, 
NPR: MORNING EDITION (Aug. 23, 2016, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/08/23/491024846/do-you-read-
terms-of-service-contracts-not-many-do-research-shows [https://perma.cc/7QYR-GEWZ] (discussing how peo-
ple share information and do not read agreements online). In the past, rent-to-own transactions raised these con-
cerns. See generally Susan Lorde Martin & Nancy White Huckins, Consumer Advocates vs. The Rent-to-Own 
Industry: Reaching a Reasonable Accommodation, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 385 (1997) (overviewing concerns about 
customer-seller interactions with rent-to-own transactions). 
 320. Sanders, supra note 244, at 13.   
 321. See Martin & Huckins, supra note 319.; AutoFi is Built for Remote Sales, supra note 314 (focusing 
primarily on the benefits of the platform for auto dealers). 
 322. See Greg Bensinger, Uber Plans to Wind Down U.S. Car-Leasing Business, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2017, 
8:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/uber-plans-to-wind-down-u-s-car-leasing-business-1502200046 
[https://perma.cc/4YX4-GUYL]. 
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drivers what later were described as subprime auto leases,323 Uber connected its 
drivers with auto dealers and lenders. Uber automatically deducted loan pay-
ments from drivers’ income.324 If a driver’s income was insufficient or if a driver 
stopped working for Uber, the driver was required to pay the lender directly.325 
Uber claimed that its program allowed low-credit-worthy drivers to purchase 
cars necessary to create better lives for themselves via driving with Uber.326 Alt-
hough some drivers praised the program, others struggled to make monthly pay-
ments on subprime loans with interest rates over 20%.327 Drivers said they felt 
stuck: “it’s either drive or meet the repo man.”328 
The program came under the FTC’s scrutiny for connecting drivers with 
subprime lenders that charged Uber drivers significantly higher interest rates 
than industry averages for consumers with similar credit scores.329 This led to 
higher than average monthly payments, which contradicted Uber’s marketing 
materials.330 These marketing materials promised that the program would allow 
drivers to “own a car for as little as $20/day.”331 Uber ultimately settled with the 
FTC for $20 million.332 When Uber shuttered its program, it stated that it lost 
eighteen times more than it had expected.333 Commentators in the auto industry 
deemed the program a “financial and ethical disaster.”334 
The alleged misrepresentation in Uber’s description of its program reflects 
two major concerns with fintech advances in consumer banking and lending. 
First, as noted with other auto loan apps, the programs may place the interests of 
partner companies ahead of consumers.335 This means that consumers are at risk 
of paying more in interest and other fees than those charged for traditional and 
even fringe banking and credit products.  
 
 323. See Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber is Phasing Out Its Subprime Car-Leasing Division After Massive Losses, 
VERGE (Aug. 8, 2017, 12:02 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/8/16112498/uber-phase-out-xchange-car-
leasing-losses  [https://perma.cc/TV5E-P8EU] (detailing the Vehicle Solutions Program).  
 324. See Molly Wood, Uber Drivers Struggle to Pay Subprime Auto Loans, MARKETPLACE (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.marketplace.org/2015/05/13/uber-drivers-struggle-pay-subprime-auto-loans/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9R32-28SK] (overviewing the car financing program). 
 325. See id. 
 326. See id. 
 327. See id. 
 328. Id.; see also Emily Badger, Uber’s Program to Help You Buy a Car Sounds Like a Sweet Deal. But 
It’s Actually Really Risky., WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2014, 7:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/wonk/wp/2014/11/06/ubers-program-to-help-you-buy-a-car-sounds-like-a-sweet-deal-but-its-actually-re-
ally-risky/ [https://perma.cc/LJ8X-ND3U] (anticipating some drivers’ concerns when the program was 
launched). 
 329. Complaint at 3–4, FTC v. Uber Tech. Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00261 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 19, 2017), https://www. 
ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1523082ubercmplt.pdf  [https://perma.cc/D4GP-ZSVM].    
 330. Id. at 4.   
 331. Id. at 9; see Gary Wollenhaupt, Uber Car Financing Has Ended: What You Can Do Instead, 
LENDINGTREE (May 21, 2020), https://www.lendingtree.com/auto/uber-car-financing/ [https://perma.cc/472L-
BXYJ] (summarizing the FTC complaint). 
 332. See Press Release, FTC, supra note 26.  
 333. See Bensinger, supra note 322. 
 334. Aaron Gordon, Uber Launches New Program to Get Drivers Who Can’t Afford Cars to Drive Cars for 
Them, JALOPNIK (May 30, 2019, 12:25 PM), https://jalopnik.com/uber-launches-new-program-to-get-drivers-
who-cant-affor-1835122927 [https://perma.cc/RQN5-8SP7].  
 335. See supra notes 320–21 and accompanying text.   
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Second, partnering with employers like Uber or Walmart raises concerns 
that consumers not only will be tied to their lending arrangements, but may also 
feel unable to leave their place of employment because of their debts.336 Besides 
smacking of indentured servitude, feeling unwilling or unable to leave an em-
ployer because of debt could impede people’s education and career advancement, 
further entrenching income and wealth inequalities. If either or both of these con-
cerns come to realization, fintech “advances” in consumer banking and lending 
could cause America to regress even further in terms of equality.   
Fintech innovations in consumer banking and lending also bring additional 
concerns. Recent research has found initial evidence of racial and ethnic discrim-
ination in fintech lending, such as mortgage lending.337 Scholars increasingly 
warn that the “tech” part of fintech results in inadvertent racial, ethnic, and gen-
der discrimination based on algorithms that leverage big data and that transcend 
human understanding.338 This is particularly concerning because fintech compa-
nies, like more traditional lenders, have been found to facilitate low-income 
households’ borrowing beyond their means.339 
The perils of these products may outweigh the promises made by compa-
nies offering these fintech advances. Nonetheless, fintech innovations continue 
to be touted as leading solutions to income and wealth inequality.340 The next 
Part draws on these critiques of fintech financial products to support our recom-




 336. See e.g., Badger, supra note 328; Cuttino, supra note 277 (manuscript at 41).   
 337. See generally Robert Bartlett et al., Consumer Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era, (Working 
Paper Nov. 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/morse/research/papers/discrim. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/4S92-FBAY] (discussing fintech lending discrimination).  
 338. See id. (noting algorithms’ “inadvertent discrimination”); Rory Van Loo, The Corporation As Court-
house, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 579–80 (2016) (explaining how automated systems could contribute to racial 
economic inequality); Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1291, 1327 (2017) (dis-
cussing the link between algorithms and racial inequality); Matthew A. Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of 
Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 25–29 (2018) (discussing concerns about fintech 
innovations in lending); Anya Price & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence 
and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1262–66 (2020) (detailing proxy discrimination and big data); MICHAEL 
KEARNS & AARON ROTH, THE ETHICAL ALGORITHM: THE SCIENCE OF SOCIALLY AWARE ALGORITHM DESIGN 
1–14 (2020) (introducing concerns about big data and algorithms); CATHY O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH 
DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016) (detailing several 
instances in which mathematical models or algorithms that purport to identify certain traits, such as credit wor-
thiness, actually serve to enforce inequality); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET 
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 101–39 (2015) (detailing data’s role in finance).   
 339. See generally Marco Di Maggio & Vincent W. Yao, FinTech Borrowers: Lax-Screening or Cream-
Skimming?, (Sept. 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/ 
conference/2019/fintech/Yao_fintech [https://perma.cc/3M4P-ECJK].  
 340. See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note 277 (manuscript at 48) (concluding that early wage access programs are 
a superior substitute to payday lending).  
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V. ENSURING BANKING AND LENDING DOES NOT EXACERBATE WEALTH 
GAPS 
Over the past several decades, home loans, student loans, payday loans and 
other fringe products have contributed to racial and ethnic wealth gaps because, 
put simply, people of color pay more for these products.341 This hinders people’s 
ability to convert income into savings.342 Over the past several years, payroll 
cards, early wage access programs, auto lending, and other seeming innovations 
in banking and lending have replaced prior mainstays of consumer banking and 
finance.343 A closer look at these products brings heightened concerns about their 
likelihood of trapping people of color, in particular, in a cycle of debt that further 
bleeds them of income and impedes their savings.344 This Part details lessons 
about how consumer banking and lending can, on the one hand, obstruct savings 
and widen wealth gaps, and on the other, be an integral part of reducing wealth 
gaps. Through this discussion, we propose four tenets for combating debt ine-
quality: access to low-cost credit, variety in credit options, policing of discrimi-
nation and the use of big data, and trustworthy places to put income and build 
savings. 
Scholars, policy makers, and politicians increasingly appreciate the seri-
ousness of the widening income and wealth gaps and are publicly discussing how 
to reverse them.345 Many recent proposals that focus on debt inequality are ani-
mated by our first tenet—access to lower-cost credit. On a small scale, for exam-
ple, Representative Katie Porter calls for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (“FDIC”) to “heighten its vigilance” in monitoring online lenders that 
partner with banks.346 As noted by Representative Porter, monitoring will police 
banks’ ability to charge higher interest rates than those provided by state usury 
caps through these partnerships.347 Also, as noted, when Congress convened in 
2020, Representative Maxine Waters advanced the Veterans and Consumer Fair 
Credit Act, which would provide a federal 36% usury limit on all payday 
loans.348 Similarly, during the 2020 presidential primaries, candidates discussed 
interest rate and fee caps.349 
 
 341. See supra Part III. 
 342. See supra Part III.  
 343. See supra Part IV. 
 344. See supra Part IV. 
 345. See supra note 14. 
 346. Anna Hrushka, Lawmaker Wants FDIC to Monitor ‘Rent-a-Bank’ Arrangements, BANKING DIVE (Dec. 
23, 2019), https://www.bankingdive.com/news/porter-fdic-monitor-rent-a-bank-arrangements/569606/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4JNY-PRHQ].   
 347. See Lydia Beyound, FDIC Urged to Monitor Online Lenders’ Bank Partnerships, BLOOMBERG L. 
(Dec. 20, 2019, 1:26 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/fdic-urged-to-monitor-online-lenders-
bank-partnerships [https://perma.cc/RF4W-DBUJ] (discussing Representative Porter’s letter to the FDIC).  
 348. Neil Haggarty, Why House Democrats Are at Odds Over Rate Cap Bill, AM. BANKER (Feb. 5, 2020, 
3:30 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-house-democrats-are-at-odds-over-rate-cap-bill; see su-
pra text accompanying note 214. 
 349. See End Wall Street’s Stranglehold on Our Economy, supra note 14; Fair Banking for All, supra note 
14. 
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Disparate terms and interest rates, however, are part of a handful of key 
aspects of mainstream and fintech consumer products that create debt inequality 
between white Americans and racial and ethnic minorities.350 Debt inequality as 
a contributor to wealth inequality and redistribution is extensive and adapta-
ble.351 Regulations and programs must attack it from multiple angles, leading to 
additional tenets.   
Our second tenet is access to a variety of different credit products. Provid-
ing a variety of lower-cost credit products to all, including communities of color, 
is critical to addressing debt inequality. As demonstrated by how payday lenders 
successfully market to communities of color,352 many people still go to physical, 
brick-and-mortar locations to take out loans.353 Likewise, because of the ubiq-
uity of the Internet and because many lower-income Americans use their phones 
to access the Internet and banking,354 banking and credit options must have 
online platforms that provide people the same lower-cost credit products.  
Black students’ experience with private student loans demonstrates how 
access and choice are critical tenets of reducing debt inequality.355 One compo-
nent in debt inequality in the student loan market is the emergence of for-profit 
educational institutions, which in turn direct their students to private lenders who 
charge higher interest rates and fees.356 Private colleges and universities also 
have high drop-out rates; not completing education makes it harder for students 
to pay back the loans.357 The coupling of for-profit institutions with private stu-
dent loan providers limits access and limits choice while increasing the price, the 
effects of which create racial inequality in the student loan market.   
Race inequality can be ameliorated through programs and regulation that 
encourage banks and lenders to offer lower-cost services to lower-income com-
munities and communities of color.358 As demonstrated by the history of payday 
loans and other fringe lending products, people need choices in their access to 
credit and banking products.359 Lack of choice leaves people feeling stuck and 
hopeless, which exacerbates tendencies to not shop around among service or 
 
 350. See supra Part III.  
 351. See supra Part III. 
 352. See supra text accompanying notes 223–28. 
 353. See supra text accompanying notes 226–32. 
 354. See Kurt Bauman, New Survey Questions Do a Better Job Capturing Mobile Use, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/08/internet-access.html [https://perma.cc/ 
Y83N-35ZF] (detailing how Americans report accessing the Internet); Ellen A. Merry, Mobile Banking: A Closer 
Look at Survey Measures, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RES. SYS. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/mobile-banking-a-closer-look-at-survey-measures-20180327.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/VEU3-EHKB] (noting an upward trend in mobile banking and that “[i]n 2017, about half of U.S. adults 
with bank accounts had used a mobile phone to access a bank account in the past year”). 
 355. See supra Section III.B. 
 356. See supra Section III.B. 
 357. See supra Section III.B. See generally Abbye Atkinson, Race, Educational Loans & Bankruptcy, 16 
MICH. J. RACE AND L. 1 (2010) (discussing the returns that accrue upon graduation).  
 358. See infra text accompanying notes 391–92. 
 359. See supra Section III.C. 
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product providers.360 Lack of choice intensifies power imbalances between pro-
viders and consumers, which allows banks and lenders to increase the cost of 
their products. Similarly, lack of choice hinders competition between providers 
in the marketplace and increases prices.361 This cumulatively exacerbates debt 
inequality. 
The consequences of lack of choice are apparent in payroll cards and early 
wage access programs. These programs may keep users out of mainstream bank-
ing and tie employees to their employers.362 Importantly, these effects ripple 
through other aspects of racial and ethnic disparities in income and wealth.363 
Turning away from mainstream banking—because brick-and-mortar outlets are 
not accessible, or because the use of other fringe products and now online plat-
forms makes traditional banking seem obsolete, or because America’s history of 
discrimination in banking and lending has led to mistrust of the traditional sys-
tem—ultimately inhibits the ability to save. People instead pay high sums to ac-
cess their own money, leaving nothing to put away. To the extent that people are 
able to save some of their income, they do not have a safe place to put it where 
that money can grow and begin to build wealth.364 
Likewise, feeling tied to an employer, whether it is true or not, inhibits peo-
ple’s ability to transition to higher paying, more fulfilling, and potentially more 
stable employment.365  Feeling stuck also inhibits people’s ability to receive 
training to move into other fields, as discussed in connection with early wage 
access programs and auto lending platforms.366 Again, this stuck feeling leads to 
wage stagnation separate and apart from the stagnation in wage growth Ameri-
cans have experienced in the prior decades.367 This too inhibits people’s ability 
to save as their income never grows despite rising costs of living.  
Our third tenet to reducing debt inequality is combating discrimination in 
lending. That some communities of color distrust traditional banks and main-
stream lending products is understandable given the long history of discrimina-
tion faced by almost all minority groups in banking and credit services.368 Be-
yond the access to credit and choice among products, combating discrimination 
is critical to reducing debt inequality.  
We intentionally discuss discrimination third, even though it may be the 
leading component of debt inequality. Lack of access and lack of choice breed 
 
 360. See infra notes 362–67. 
 361. See Van Loo, supra note 13, at 245–47, 254–55, 271–75 (noting fintech distributional implications on 
inequality and proposing ways to improve consumers’ access and choice, such as the CFPB taking a role in 
promoting competition in fintech).  
 362. See supra Sections IV.A., IV.B.  
 363. See supra Sections IV.A., IV.B. 
 364. Because this subpart focuses on debt inequity and access to productive banking and lending products, 
it does not address systemic issues with homeownership as wealth-building vehicle. For more on that topic, see 
supra Section III.A. 
 365. See supra Sections IV.A., IV.B.   
 366. See supra Sections IV.B., IV.C. 
 367. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44. 
 368. See supra Part III. 
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discrimination.369 These two tenets to reducing debt inequality focus on demand-
side issues. Stunted demand incentivizes the supply side—banks and other lend-
ers—to exploit failures in the market that arise from the demand disruptions.370 
How discrimination historically has played out demonstrates the importance of 
addressing both the demand and supply side. For instance, debt inequality in the 
home mortgage market resulted from marketing subprime loans to credit worthy 
individuals based on race and ethnicity.371 Black and Latinx families reluctantly 
accept subprime loans, in part, because of a lack of options, real or perceived.372 
They also arguably had to accept these loans because of how discrimination man-
ifested: as hard-to-prove implicit bias bolstered by seemingly logical reasons for 
primarily offering subprime loans, such as the slower appreciation of house val-
ues in minority neighborhoods, which subprime loans themselves fed.373 
Combating discrimination requires a holistic view of how discrimination 
arises in particular lending markets. Discrimination in the home mortgage market 
undoubtedly is evolving every day, as people turn from traditional mortgage 
loans to using products like Quicken Loans’ Rocket Mortgage and mobile lend-
ing platforms.374 As noted with auto lending platforms, the introduction of ma-
chine learning and algorithms into lending decision rubrics requires different tac-
tics to identify and stop racial and ethnic discrimination.375 Any proposal to 
reduce debt inequality must address the rapidly changing use of online platforms, 
big data, and machine learning.   
Our fourth (and final) tenet for combating debt inequality does not deal 
directly with consumer credit. Instead, it recognizes that debt and savings are two 
sides of the same coin. Just as people need access, choice, and a system that 
identifies and addresses discrimination in the consumer credit sector, they also 
need accessible, trustworthy places to put income and build savings. Banks tra-
ditionally were those places.376 Over the past decades, however, many Ameri-
cans have fallen out of mainstream banking,377 and American banks repeatedly 
have failed Black households.378 
Falling out or being driven from those places designed to help people build 
their wealth leads to an inability to save productively and to the opportunity for 
fringe lenders and other institutions to establish themselves as the sole provider 
of all “money services” to their customers.379 These services often cost people 
 
 369. See supra notes 359–61 and accompanying text.   
 370. See Van Loo, supra note 13, at 246–47. 
 371. See supra Section III.A. 
 372. See id.   
 373. See id. 
 374. See Rocket Mortgage, https://www.rocketmortgage.com/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ 
YLF6-SSTY].  
 375. See supra text accompanying note 338. 
 376. See generally Baradaran, supra note 238 (noting how the United States government previously enlisted 
banks and other financial institutions to provide services to lower-income communities). 
 377. See supra text accompanying notes 127–30. 
 378. See generally BARADARAN, supra note 22. 
 379. See supra text accompanying notes 127–30.   
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even more money, a burden that falls disproportionately on communities of 
color.380 
One viable alternative to traditional banks is public banking. This idea is 
less controversial than its critics suggest.381 As detailed by Mehrsa Baradaran, in 
1910, President Taft created the Postal Savings System, which turned post of-
fices into banks that accepted small deposits.382 The program was “wildly suc-
cessful.”383 At present, most developed countries have some sort of public bank-
ing option, usually attached to their postal service. 384  Postal banking using 
already established United States Postal Service (“USPS”) locations would offer 
accessible branches to people across the country and a system backed by the 
government.385 The security and convenience of postal banks may encourage un-
banked and underbanked individuals to deposit small sums—sums that could 
grow over time. Indeed, the Postal Savings System saw $20 million deposits in 
its first year, “most of which had been coaxed out of hiding.”386 Postal banking 
could also cause traditional banks to lower their rates to compete for business.  
The USPS Inspector General published a white paper in 2014 that floated 
the idea of postal banking.387 At the time, Senator Elizabeth Warren spoke pub-
licly in favor of postal banking.388 Senator Kristin Gillibrand and Congress-
woman Yvette Clarke subsequently picked up the idea in 2018 when they spon-
sored legislation to allow people to open small checking and interest-bearing 
savings accounts via the USPS.389 
 
 380. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
 381. Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 164, 170–72 (2014) (detailing 
historic support for postal banking); see also Adam Levitin, Postal Banking: Maybe Not So Crazy After All, AM. 
BANKER (Jan. 31, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/postal-banking-maybe-not-so-
crazy-after-all [https://perma.cc/3V93-9GS4] (discussing the Postal Saving System); Thomas Herndon & Mark 
Paul, A Public Banking Option, ROOSEVELT INST. (Aug. 2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2020/07/RI-Public-Banking-Option-201808.pdf  [https://perma.cc/3TYZ-BT92] (arguing for postal bank-
ing).  
 382. Baradaran, supra note 381, at 170–72; Levitin, supra note 381; Herndon & Paul, supra note 381.  
 383. Baradaran, supra note 381, at 170. 
 384. See Levitin, supra note 381. 
 385. See id. (detailing the benefits of postal banking); Baradaran, supra note 381, at 166–69 (illustrating the 
benefits of postal banking). 
 386. See Baradaran, supra note 381, at 170 (quoting JAMES GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND 90 (1992)).   
 387. Providing Non-Bank Financial Services for the Underserved, U. S. POSTAL SERV.: OFF. OF INSPECTOR 
GEN. (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2015/rarc-wp-14-007 
_0.pdf  [https://perma.cc/8TJS-5A9U]; see also The Road Ahead for Postal Financial Services, U.S. POSTAL 
SERV.: OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. (May 21, 2015), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-
files/2015/rarc-wp-15-011_0.pdf  [https://perma.cc/L96D-HUM5].   
 388. See Alan Pyke, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Replacing Payday Lenders with The Post Office, THINK 
PROGRESS (Feb. 3, 2014, 5:21 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/elizabeth-warren-proposes-replacing-payday-lend-
ers-with-the-post-office-ed9d53dab947/ [https://perma.cc/WDD3-E3CF].   
 389. S. 2755, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 5816, 115th Cong. (2018); see also Abby Vesoulis, Millions of 
Americans Can’t Afford a Checking Account. The Post Office Could Fix That, TIME (Aug. 7, 2018, 11:04 AM), 
https://time.com/5351706/postal-banking-kirsten-gillibrand/ [https://perma.cc/L9DV-BCBH] (reporting on the 
proposed legislation). Senators Warren and Sanders both proposed postal banking during the 2020 presidential 
primaries. See End Wall Street’s Stranglehold On Our Economy, supra note 14; Fair Banking for All, supra note 
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Alternatively, the history of American banking includes decades of public-
private partnership. The current system in which a handful of massive banks op-
erate largely unregulated is best characterized as an aberration.390 Reviving the 
social contract between banks and the government, thereby infusing a public pur-
pose into now almost exclusively private operations will require banks once 
again to provide safe and accessible options to all Americans.391 The result has 
the potential to be similar to establishing postal banks. 
In summary, we identify four tenets to reducing the debt inequality that is 
an integral part of racial and wealth gaps in America. First is access to lower-
cost credit. Second is choice among products, both the products themselves and 
how customers find providers. Third is to develop tactics for identifying and 
combating discrimination that recognize discrimination manifests differently de-
pending on the type of product. Fourth is a public option for safely building sav-
ings.   
America’s growing income and wealth inequality stems from a variety of 
long-standing, systemic issues.392 The debt inequality focused on in this Article 
is but one aspect of an economic, social, and political system stacked against 
people of color. Because debt inequality is a key component of this system, how-
ever, combating this inequality is critical to curbing America’s current course 
toward an even more disparate society.  
VI. CONCLUSION: MOVING PAST DEBT INEQUALITY AND BUILDING WEALTH 
For the past several decades, America has been in the midst of the greatest 
redistribution of wealth from the poor to the rich in its history.393 As outstanding 
debt has ballooned in reaction, debt inequality has played an increasingly im-
portant role in exacerbating the wealth distribution.394  The gap between the 
haves and have nots in America is so drastic that wealth and income inequality 
threaten to undermine the American economy and society, as recognized by 
some of the wealthiest Americans and by some policy makers.395 
This recognition brings a pivotal moment in the United States. This moment 
was evident before the COVID-19 pandemic, but now it is even more palpable 
in light of the depth and gravity of America’s racial and ethnic economic ine-
quality that the ensuing economic and health crisis has exposed.396 America may 
well be at the brink of deciding how to try to reverse the wealth gap, which makes 
 
 390. See generally Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283 
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this the time to address the interrelated factors that have fed the United States’ 
widening wealth gap. Each of these factors is a link in the chain of events and 
struggles that prevent American households from building wealth. The need to 
take out credit at high interest rates and fees, and the need to pay for access to 
one’s own money—that is, debt inequality—is one of these key factors. Debt 
inequality can result in a transfer of money from lower-income households (the 
have nots) to wealthier households (the already haves). Debt inequality thereby 
exacerbates the effects of income inequality and feeds the wealth gap.  
Communities of color have been hit the hardest by these links in the chain 
that generate the wealth gap.397 Focusing on these communities allows for a ro-
bust assessment of the ways in which debt inequality has fed and may continue 
to feed the wealth gap. Both in the past and continuing into the present, commu-
nities of color face discrimination in home mortgages, student loans, alternative 
financial services, and access to mainstream banks.398 In recent years, fintech 
banking and lending companies have offered communities of color (and other 
lower-income Americans) new “advances” in accessing money and credit.399 A 
review of these advances shows that they likely replicate many long-standing 
banking and credit problems that foster debt inequality, while also raising new 
concerns about people’s relationship with their employers and the use of big data.  
That these new products are marketed as solutions to the problems that peo-
ple previously have faced with banking and lending institutions only heightens 
the need for a comprehensive plan to address debt inequality. Otherwise, debt 
inequality will continue to feed wealth inequality, impeding other efforts to help 
communities of color and lower-income Americans build their wealth. The pub-
lic discourse fostered by the recognition of the economic and social precipice 
America is teetering on has shone much-needed light on the most important ten-
ets in tackling debt inequality. Now is the time to move forward with a broad set 
of plans for reforming Americans’ access to banking and lending services nec-
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